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Preface
Ever since Paul Romer’s theory of Endogenous technological change, economic growth has
been closely associated with innovation and research to increase technological knowledge,
improve production processes and extend the range of available products. Innovation
enables perpetual economic growth as it yields private returns to innovators and public
returns to the economy. Private returns are variety blueprints or production technologies
that give innovators an advantage over competitors and allow them to reap positive profits.
The public return is non-rival knowledge that becomes available to other members of the
economy and facilitates future innovations. To sustain growth, appropriate intellectual
property rights (IPR) institutions have to be established to protect private incentives
to innovate. What is appropriate, however, depends on the perspective of individual
countries and policy makers.
In a globalized world, knowledge dissipates beyond national borders via trade and foreign
direct investments (FDI) where heterogeneous IPR institutions are in place. In particular,
developed and developing countries take a different view on IPRs: As technology leader,
developed countries take a strong interest in the protection of domestic innovations.
Developing countries, on the other hand, are lagging in technological development and
not capable of efficient innovation themselves. Therefore, they benefit more from access
to advanced technologies for imitation and production rather than from strong IPR
protection or knowledge spillovers they might be unable to absorb.
VII
Much of international growth theory has centered on this principle opposition of innovative
developed countries and imitative developing countries. However, fortunately, there are
multiple cases in which countries could break out of their backward position to emerge
towards the technological frontier, with Japan and the Asian Tiger states as the prime
examples. What is more, further countries have started out on the transition path. A
clear indication is that developing countries start to invest in innovation. For instance,
expenditures on R&D in non-OECD countries as a share of global R&D increased from
less than 12% to over 18% from 1996 to 2005. For 2007, the UNESCO Institute for
Statistics reports that developing countries accounted for almost 24% of world R&D
expenditures and employed approximately 38% of world researchers. At the same time,
advanced countries like the USA start to invest in R&D in Asian emerging countries via
FDI.
Despite its significance for the development of countries, this emerging process of lagging
economies has received little attention in the theoretical growth literature in which
countries are usually assigned static roles as innovators or imitators. My research,
therefore, is centered around the questions emerging countries face as they extend their
economic activities to innovation: How can resources be redirected towards knowledge
accumulation and creation? How can spillovers from FDI be used to access foreign
knowledge? How have IPRs to adjust to promote innovation and how can losses in the
imitation sector be compensated?
In the first two chapters of my dissertation, I approach these questions from a theoretical
point of view. My work is based on North-South models with innovative developed
countries (North) and imitative developing countries (South). This setup is extended to
analyze the development of an innovation sector in the South and its implications for the
choice of IPR institutions.
VIII
The first chapter of my dissertation, Intellectual Property Rights as determinants of FDI,
technology spillovers and R&D in developing economies, based on a paper of the same
name, focuses on the interplay of imitation, innovation and FDI in the development of a
competitive southern innovation sector. Emerging countries benefit from the inflow of
knowledge from advanced economies which possess superior technologies and experience
in innovation. For policy makers in developing countries, striking the balance between
the promotion of FDI, nurturing a growing domestic innovation sector and allowing
imitation is necessary while policy measures can be contradicting and ineffective. The
paper shows that the knowledge capital embodied in FDI supports the domestic R&D
sector. Impediments to FDI as an attempt to reduce competition for domestic research
fail as they primarily hamper technology adaption. Stronger IPR protection leads to
a transfer of R&D to emerging countries. However, the extension of FDI potentially
crowds out domestic innovations.
In the second chapter, Imitation and Innovation Driven Development under Imperfect
Intellectual Property Rights, based on joint work with Monique Newiak under the same
name, we allow for southern R&D and imitation directed to innovations originating in
both regions. The South can set the level of IPRs and discriminate between protection
for domestic and foreign firms to balance its interests in imitation and the promotion of
domestic innovation. We find the effects of IPRs on R&D and welfare to be non-monotonic
and dependent on the R&D efficiency and an innovation threshold in the South. For
sufficiently strong IPRs, the South engages in R&D and stronger IPRs promote southern
R&D, welfare, and reduce the North-South wage gap. Below the R&D threshold, a
strengthening of IPR protection fails to promote R&D and decreases welfare and wages.
Stronger IPRs exclusively for southern firms can benefit both regions by shifting southern
resources from the imitation of northern goods to original southern innovation.
IX
The third chapter, Robust FDI determinants, Intellectual Property Rights and Parameter
Heterogeneity, based on joint work with Theo Eicher and Monique Newiak, investigates
the importance of IPRs for binational FDI flows. The empirical study of FDI determinants
allows to make inferences about the components, motives and adversaries of foreign
investments which, in light of potential knowledge spillovers associated with FDI, is
crucial knowledge for policy makers. We particularly focus on the analysis of different IPR
measures to explain the intensive and extensive margins of FDI. Using Heckit Bayesian
Model Averaging, we address both model uncertainty and the selection problem inherent
in FDI data. To reveal parameter heterogeneities, we estimate the complete sample and
split the observations for developed and developing host countries. For the global sample,
we find that patent enforcement and the protection of patent rights attract FDI flows
whereas trademarks increase the probability to invest in FDI but reduce the volume.
The separate analysis shows that (1) for developed countries, IPR protection in the host
country has a large influence on FDI flows whereas (2) IPR protection in the source
country is more relevant for investments into developing countries. This indicates that
FDI flows into developed countries contain more sensitive knowledge capital and are
more likely deterred by risks of leakages to competitors in the host country than FDI
flows into developing countries.
X
Chapter 1
Intellectual Property Rights as determinants of FDI,
technology spillovers and R&D in developing economies∗
Abstract
The main channels of technology and knowledge acquisition for developing
countries are FDI, imitation and domestic knowledge creation. However, policy
measures to promote individual channels can be contradicting and interactions
between channels render policy measures ineffective. This paper analyzes policy
effects in light of these interrelations. The results show that the knowledge
capital embodied in FDI supports the domestic R&D sector while impediments
to FDI primarily hamper technology adoption in the South and fail as an
instrument to promote domestic research by reduced competition from abroad.
Stronger intellectual property rights protection in developing countries leads
to a transfer of R&D to emerging countries. However, the extension of FDI
potentially crowds out domestic innovations.
Keywords: Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation, Foreign Direct Investments,
Development
∗I thank Theo Eicher, Monique Newiak, Matthias Doepke and Steve Turnovsky for helpful comments
and suggestions. The paper has also greatly benefited from the comments and suggestions by seminar
participants at the University of Munich and the University of Washington. All remaining errors are
mine. I thank the University of Washington for their support and hospitality during the preparation of
this paper. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the German Research Foundation through
GRK 801.
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1.1 Introduction
For developing countries, the acquisition of foreign knowledge and technologies from
advanced economies and promotion of domestic R&D are essential for a successful
transition from low-cost manufacturing economies to innovative industrialized countries.
Foreign direct investments (FDI), domestic R&D, imitation and trade are the most
prominent channels to achieve a higher technology level. As these channels are interrelated,
however, their promotion can require conflicting policies. Imitation allows learning
by copying existing technologies and raises employment in otherwise non-competitive
economies (Glass, 2010; Helpman, 1993). At the same time, the risk of imitation
deters foreign investors and leads to inefficient resource allocations (Gustafsson and
Segerstrom, 2011; Glass and Saggi, 2002). FDI brings foreign expertise and technology
into developing countries but also creates additional competition for domestic firms for
market shares and local resources (Lall, 2002). Thus, the interdependence mechanisms
between the channels of technology acquisition are crucial knowledge for the catch-
up of transition countries. This paper analyzes the influence of intellectual property
rights (IPRs) and FDI policies on the attractiveness of developing countries for FDI, the
acquisition of knowledge for domestic R&D and the availability of imitations.
The necessity for a joint analysis derives from the coexistence of imitation, FDI and R&D
in developing countries that has emerged in recent decades. The OECD (2008a) reports an
increasing share of world R&D hosted in developing countries. The distribution of Gross
domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) shifts towards non-OECD countries whose share in
global R&D increased from less than 12% to over 18% from 1996 to 2005. A similar pattern
arises for business R&D expenditures of profit-oriented enterprises. In China, South
Africa, Russia and India, the ratios of R&D expenditure to GDP exceed those of high
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income countries like Greece and Portugal. For 2007, UIS (2009)1 reports that developing
countries accounted for almost 24% of world GERD and employed approximately 38% of
world researchers. Those R&D efforts result both from investments by domestic firms in
developing countries as well as by foreign firms whose FDI expenditures are increasingly
designated for R&D. The OECD (2008b) reports that R&D expenditures of affiliates of
US parent companies are increasingly spent in the Asia-Pacific region, rising from 4.6% in
1995 to 12% in 2005 (excluding Japan). For instance, after 0.1% in 1995 China attracts
about 2.5% of US worldwide R&D FDI in 2005. In a survey in the United Nations World
Investment Report 2005, China, India and Russia were reported among the top 10 most
attractive R&D locations. The shares of foreign-funded R&D in total GERD for 2007 are
still relatively low for China (1.3%) and Mexico (1.4%) but substantial for e.g. Russia
(7.4%) and Eastern European countries2, exceeding 10% (UIS, 2011) .
This paper uses a North-South structure of the world economy in which the North is at
the frontier of technology. Agents in both regions can engage in innovation to develop new
differentiated goods that are sold on monopolistic markets. To account for the increase
in research-based FDI, northern investments in the South include the development of
new products and their subsequent production. While FDI is attracted by differences
in labor costs and a competitive advantage in R&D compared to southern firms, FDI
goods are subject to imitation that results from insufficient IPR protection in the South.
The benefits to the South from FDI include the transfer of knowledge capital, more
efficient innovation and a higher demand for domestic labor. While the accumulation of
knowledge promotes the domestic R&D sector, profits from FDI are transferred to the
North. Imitation of FDI goods allows the competitive production in the South to the
1The UNESCO Institute for Statistics.
2Ukraine, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Estonia and Croatia.
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benefit of consumers and labor demand. However, the South is faced with the trade-off
between low IPR protection and easy access to imitation, and higher IPR protection
with more FDI incentives and faster knowledge accumulation. In addition to imitation,
the costs for FDI firms to develop a new product variety and produce in the foreign
market depend on the FDI policy of the South. Impediments may derive from restrictions
on market access, requirements to enter joint ventures and bureaucratic costs.3 Those
measures may be employed to protect domestic firms from competition by increasing the
costs to enter the market for foreign firms.
The results show that higher IPR protection in the South strengthens FDI incentives and
leads to an extension of research activity in the South. This reduces the knowledge gap
and wage disadvantage to the developed region. The effect on domestic research depends
on the FDI policy in the South: R&D by local firms increases only if impediments to
FDI are sufficiently low. Otherwise, the South will not be able to acquire sufficient
knowledge capital to withstand competition from FDI firms and domestic innovation is
crowded out. Thus, impediments to foreign investments are no sensible policy instrument
to promote domestic research. On the other hand, a reduction of impediments to FDI
creates a knowledge inflow that raises R&D incentives in the South and its share in global
innovation. This effect potentially outweighs additional FDI incentives such that R&D
in the South increases at the expense of FDI.
The next section gives an overview over the relevant literature. It follows a description
of the model and the balanced growth path. Comparative statics show the influence of
intellectual property rights and impediments to FDI on southern participation in R&D,
FDI and imitation. A numerical analysis looks at the impact on welfare.
3As an example for additional FDI costs, The Economist (1999) recounts difficulties for foreign firms
in China with local authorities, business partners and markets.
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1.2 Literature
The literature has mostly focused on individual channels of knowledge transfer to evaluate
their importance for technology spillovers and the transition process. In the seminal
paper Helpman (1993), imitation is the principle means for developing countries (the
’South’) to gain access to technology developed in advanced economies (the ’North’).
Given their lack of innovative capabilities, the South relies on imitation blueprints as
a prerequisite for production. With stronger IPR protection, imitation and innovation
decrease as northern labor is bound in production.4 Deardorff (1992) makes the case
that a geographical limitation of IPR protection helps to reduce monopolistic distortions
and improve technology access for developing countries.
The strict assignment of innovator and imitator roles to North and South has been
extended to allow the study of interrelations. FDI is a means to transfer production
from the North to the South which takes account of the comparative advantage of the
North in innovation and the South in production. The South then faces a trade-off in
its IPR policy between the attractiveness for FDI and availability of imitations. From
a theoretical point of view, Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2011) find that FDI is strictly
promoted by better IPR protection as the risk of imitation decreases. The shift of
production to the South allows the North to make use of its comparative advantage
in innovation to increase global innovation. The same results are found by Lai (1998)
who directly compares IPR effects when production transfer occurs by imitation of the
North or FDI in a quality-ladder framework. On the other hand, Glass and Saggi (2002)
point to the loss of resources in developing countries when IPRs are increased: more
4In an extended version of the model with weak-scale effect and trade costs, Gustafsson and
Segerstrom (2010) derive similar conclusions.
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resources are drawn into a less efficient imitation process leading to increased factor
prices. The resulting disincentive to FDI overcompensates the positive effect of a lower
imitation rate and leads to fewer FDI. Glass and Saggi (1998) use a quality-ladder model
in which imitation of low-quality goods enables the South to gather the necessary stock
of knowledge to attract high-quality FDI. As imitation targets only low-quality goods,
no deterring effect occurs. On the contrary, high-quality FDI increases with imitation
and frees resources for innovation in the North. These models assume that the South is
recipient of FDI and imitator but does not engage in original R&D itself. This does not
account for developing countries which make the transition to innovators and gives only
limited insights into the role of knowledge spillovers embodied in FDI.
In empirical studies, the influence of intellectual property rights protection on the volume
and composition of FDI has been found to be considerable. Lee and Mansfield (1996) find
that IPRs have significant positive effects on both the volume as well as the composition
of FDI in terms of its technology-intensity. Javorcik (2004) specifically analyzes the
composition of FDI using firm-level data of Eastern European countries and confirms
that lower IPR protection deters FDI especially from technology-intensive firms and
leads to FDI that focuses on distribution rather than production of goods. A positive
contribution of FDI to productivity in the receiving country has been shown, among
others, by Borensztein et al. (1998) and Xu (2000). Both studies show that FDI promotes
technology diffusion from developed to developing countries but that a certain level of
development is necessary to absorb foreign technologies.
Another class of models attends to the spillover effect from imitation and its effect on
southern innovative capabilities. Glass (2010) allows for innovation in the South where
imitation functions as a prerequisite for innovation by providing the required knowledge
base. She shows that if imitation limits southern innovation, indiscriminate subsidies to
imitation and innovation will increase southern and aggregate innovation and decrease
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the imitation rate. If imitation is not a restricting factor, the effect on imitation is
unclear. Newiak (2011) analyzes the role of IPRs in the South when innovation is more
efficient the more knowledge capital is appropriated via innovation and imitation. She
finds that stronger IPR protection benefits the South only if the innovation sector is
sufficiently large relative to imitation. Similarly, chapter 2 (Lorenczik and Newiak, 2011)
shows that stronger IPR protection can strengthen the southern innovation sector if it is
sufficiently developed, generating higher innovation incentives and labor demand in the
South. The model emphasizes the competition for R&D resources but does not consider
learning effects from imitation. In Van Elkan (1996), the production efficiency benefits
from independent knowledge creation (innovation) and adoption of foreign technologies
(imitation). However, knowledge is non-rival which does not create a conflict of IPR
protection between North and South.5 These papers exclude an FDI sector as a source
for knowledge accumulation and technology transfer which reduces the trade-off to the
resource allocation between innovation and imitation.
Empirical evidence on the growth effect of FDI is mixed. For Venezuelan firm-level data,
Aitken and Harrison (1999) find a positive productivity effect for small enterprises while
domestic firms experience negative spillovers from increased competition. Borensztein
et al. (1998) emphasize the importance of developing countries’ absorption capabilities.
Falvey et al. (2006) find positive growth effects of IPR protection for low and high income
countries. For low income countries, FDI promotes growth but does not encourage
domestic R&D or the (underdeveloped) imitation sector. In middle-income countries, a
positive effect of stronger IPR protection on FDI is offset by a reduced imitation sector.
Agosin and Machado (2005) note that the impact of FDI on domestic investments is
ambiguous and may lead to a crowding-out effect in developing countries.
5The implications are different in nature from the usual North-South conflict in that both countries
would benefit from not being in the position of the technology leader/innovator.
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1.3 Model
1.3.1 Basic structure
The world economy consists of two regions North and South of which the North is techno-
logically advanced in its research capabilities. Representative households in both regions
consume a variety of differentiated goods offered by firms in monopolistic competition on
the world market. Labor is the only factor used in production and the development of
blueprints for new varieties. It is mobile within all sectors of one region but immobile
between regions, giving a single regional wage rate. New varieties are developed in the
North and in the South. While the North has access to a larger knowledge base which
reduces the labor costs of developing a blueprint, the South uses a limited amount of
world knowledge determined by spillovers and domestic research. The North can conduct
innovative R&D domestically or via FDI in the South, in which case southern labor is
hired for the blueprint development and subsequent production. However, innovations
abroad are subject to an imitation risk as a result of imperfect IPR protection in the
South. Once imitated, a variety is offered at marginal costs in an environment of perfect
competition. Proceeds from non-imitated varieties go to the North. Thus, in contrast to
other models, FDI comprises innovation and production in the South to account for the
increasing share of R&D in FDI. Existing innovations in the North are not transferred to
the South via FDI.6
6For models that analyze a shift of northern innovations to the South, see Gustafsson and
Segerstrom (2011) and Glass and Saggi (2002, 1998)
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1.3.2 Households
Each region is inhabited by a fixed measure of households whose size grows exponentially
at a constant rate gL. Each member of a household is endowed with one unit of labor
which is supplied inelastically to the labor market. Labor supply in North and South at
time t is given by LNt = L
N
0 e
gLt and LSt =L
S
0 e
gLt, respectively. Households in the two
regions are identical concerning their preferences and maximize the discounted lifetime
flow of utility7
U(t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−(ρ−gL)t lnu(t)dt, u(t) =
[∫ nt
0
xαj,tdj
] 1
α
(1.1)
where ρ is the rate of time preference and gL < ρ. The utility at each point in time
u(t) arises from consumption of a basket of n differentiated varieties available on the
world market; xj,t is the per capita quantity demanded of variety j, and α is a measure
of the degree of product differentiation with 0 < α < 1, where smaller values of α imply
a higher product differentiation. It is related to the elasticity of substitution between
varieties σ by σ = 11−α . Households are constrained by their wage and asset income,
giving rise to the budget constraint a˙ = ra+ w − e− gLa. In this budget constraint, et
indicates consumption expenditures, w represents the wage income and r is the interest
rate paid on asset holdings a in the respective region. For the North, aN is the value of
shares from northern innovative firms and FDI firms. In the South, aS contains shares
of southern innovating firm. Solving the consumer’s maximization problem for North
and South we obtain x¯j,t, the average per capita demand for variety j by consumers
in both regions at time t, x¯j,t =
e¯t
Pt
(
pj,t
Pt
)−σ
, where e¯t represents average consumption
7The household problem does not indicate a specific region as it is identical for North and South.
Superscripts are used to refer to a specific region where necessary. For brevity, time subjects are omitted
whenever no risk of ambiguity arises.
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expenditures per consumer defined as e¯t = (e
N tLNt + e
S
t L
S
t )/Lt; pj,t is the price of variety
j and Lt = L
N
t + L
S
t . The aggregate price index is defined as Pt =
[∫ nt
0 p
1−σ
j,t dj
] 1
1−σ
. Let
ct ≡ et/Pt denote real consumption expenditures. Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977),
this measure also represents consumers’ utility at time t; we thus have ct = ut. Solving
the household problem shows that nominal expenditures grow at e˙tet = rt − ρ, and thus
only increase over time if the market interest rate rt exceeds the individual discount
rate ρ.
1.3.3 R&D and Imitation
Both regions have the ability to innovate new product varieties where the available
knowledge capital and infrastructure determine the efficiency of the development process.
The total number of varieties is denoted by n which is subdivided into innovations in the
North, nNR , FDI-financed innovations in the South, n
S
F , of which n
S
C are imitated in the
South, and original southern innovations nSR, i.e. n = n
N
R + n
S
F + n
S
C + n
S
R. Each variety
is produced by an atomistic firm. The development of new varieties is modeled after
Jones (1995). It requires labor input according to the following functions for northern
innovations, FDI financed innovation in the South and southern innovations, respectively:
n˙NR =
nθ`NR
aN
(1.2a)
n˙SF + n˙
S
C =
nθ`SF
aSφ
(1.2b)
n˙SR =
nθkS`SR
aS
(1.2c)
Innovators in both regions make use of the existing stock of knowledge embodied in
the number of available varieties n. The degree of knowledge spillovers from past R&D
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is determined by the parameter θ < 1 which implies that knowledge spillovers become
weaker over time and rules out strong scale effects. While the North can make use of
knowledge originating in both regions, i.e. has perfect knowledge spillovers across regions,
the South can only access domestically created knowledge capital while knowledge from
northern innovations cannot be appropriated.8 kS indicates the fraction of knowledge
originating in the South and available to Southern innovators given by kS =
nSR+n
S
F+n
S
C
n .
This limitation does not affect FDI firms which make use of the whole set of knowledge.
aN and aS are region-specific R&D productivity parameters which capture differences in
infrastructure and market environment rather than knowledge. For a given knowledge
capital, they determine the labor costs for the R&D process from the innovation to the
introduction of the product to the market that all atomistic firms face.9 φ measures
additional costs for FDI firms relative to domestic southerns innovators. It is larger than
1 where higher values indicate an unfavorable FDI policy deriving from bureaucratic
burdens, specific regulations for foreign firms or frictions from an unfamiliar business
environment.10 I assume that those factors are, to some extent, deliberately set by the
South. The closer φ is to 1, the fewer impediments to northern investments exist.
The risk of imitation for FDI firms is given by the imitation rate i =
n˙SC
nSF
. It is thus defined
as the probability that an FDI variety is imitated as a result of imperfect IPR protection
at any moment in time. Alternatively, it can be regarded as the probability that a patent
8Similar notions of international knowledge spillovers are employed by Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010)
and Currie et al. (1999).
9The World Bank (2011) accesses the market environment in terms of procedures, time and costs of
starting a business, acquiring permits, legal issues etc. A result from the Ranking on the ease of doing
business is that the strength of legal institutions is highest and the complexity and costs of regulatory
processes are lowest in OECD and other high income countries and less favorable in other regions.
10While some impediments to foreign firms may be unintended, imposed joint ventures or restricted
access to some sectors deliberately favor local firms compared to FDI companies (Ianchovichina and
Walmsley, 2003).
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is not enforced by the South.11 If not enforced, the production blueprint is available
to a large number of southern imitators and will be produced by a competitive fringe.
The imitation rate is controlled by the South by the strength of IPR protection which
functions as a policy instrument for the South to regulate the availability of imitated
varieties and attractiveness of FDI. Imitation is exogenous for the market participants.
The model abstracts from imitation of North-based and southern domestic innovations.
1.3.4 Investment into innovation
When making their investment decision, firms adjust instantaneous profits by the change
in firm value, interest rate and risk of imitation to calculate the present discounted value
of an innovation and compare this value to the blueprint costs. Let vNR , v
S
F and v
S
R
denote the firm values at time t for a northern innovation, FDI-blueprint and southern
innovation, respectively. At the time of development, the blueprint costs have to equal
the firm value under the assumption of free market entry. Investment into new varieties
takes place until no excess profits can be generated. The blueprint (i.e. development)
costs for a new variety derive from the R&D functions (1.2) and are determined by the
amount of labor needed times the wage rate. The costs are given by
vNR =
aNw
N
nθ
(1.3a)
vSF =
aSφw
S
nθ
(1.3b)
vSR =
aSk
SwS
nθ
(1.3c)
11This notion of IPR protection is used in, among others, Grossman and Lai (2004) and Gustafsson
and Segerstrom (2011). An equivalent approach is to regard i as the probability that the innovator
cannot obtain an enforceable patent immediately after the variety is developed as in Eicher and Garc´ıa-
Pen˜alosa (2008).
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I assume perfect capital mobility within a region but financial autarky between North
and South. Imitation risks can be fully diversified by holding the market portfolio such
that firm assets bear no excess risks. No arbitrage between an investment in safe assets
with return r and an investment in innovative firms ensures equal returns to both. For
the North, the no-arbitrage condition is given by
piNR
vNR
+
v˙NR
vNR
= rN , i.e. per period profits
piNR relative to the firm value and the change in firm value have to equal r
N . The
condition for southern original R&D follows accordingly. For FDI goods, additionally
the risk of imitation has to be taken into account leading to the no-arbitrage condition
piSF
vSF
+
v˙SF
vSF
− i = rS . From (1.3) follows a constant change in firm value of v˙v = −θg, where
g ≡ n˙n is the growth rate of the total number of varieties. The no-arbitrage conditions
give the appropriately discounted profits and can be written as
vNR =
piNR
rN + θg
(1.4a)
vSF =
piSF
rN + θg + i
(1.4b)
vSR =
piSR
rS + θg
(1.4c)
Both costs (1.3) and discounted profits (1.4) determine the relative number of varieties
in equilibrium.
1.3.5 Production
Goods production requires one unit of labor for each output unit, i.e. for the production
quantity x¯j , `Y,j = x¯j units of labor have to be employed. Monopolistic competition
implies that firms set prices with a mark-up over marginal costs determined by the degree
of product differentiation α. The only exception are imitated goods that are priced at
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marginal costs. The prices for each variety are given by
pNR =
wN
α
, pSF =
wS
α
= pSR, p
S
C = wS (1.5)
The profit maximization problem of firms gives the instantaneous profits as
piNR =
1− α
α
wN x¯
N
RL (1.6a)
piSF =
1− α
α
wS x¯
S
FL (1.6b)
piSR =
1− α
α
wS x¯
S
RL (1.6c)
Instantaneous profits are generated indefinitely for northern and southern innovations.
FDI profits cease when imitation occurs, at which point the blueprint becomes freely
available for production by perfectly competitive firms in the South. This implies that
imitators do not generate positive profits.
1.3.6 Labor markets
Finally, labor market clearing in North and South requires that the sum of workers
employed in the R&D and production sectors equals the total labor force in each region.
In the North, labor is allocated into R&D and production: LN = `NR + `
N
Y . In the South,
labor is allocated into R&D funded by North and South and production of FDI, southern
and imitated goods: LS = `SR + `
S
F + `
S
Y . Labor supply is inelastic and wages adjust to
equalize labor demand and supply in both regions.
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1.4 Balanced growth path
This section derives the steady-state equilibrium and analyzes the conditions that de-
termine the equilibrium properties. The costs and benefits described in the previous
section define the global innovation intensity and shares of each sector, the relative wage
between the regions and the knowledge gap of the South.
1.4.1 Definition of the equilibrium and long-run growth
The equilibrium is given by a set of prices, wages and interest rates in North and South
such that the allocation of labor into the different sectors, number of varieties and
their supply, consumption expenditures and asset holdings (1) solves the utility and
profit maximization problems of households and firms and (2) labor, goods and financial
markets clear given free market entry of firms. In this steady state equilibrium, variety
growth g ≡ n˙/n, the South-North wage ratio ω ≡ wN/wS , the variety shares γNR ≡ nNR /n,
γSF ≡ nSF /n, γSR ≡ nSR/n and γSC ≡ nSC/n, and the shares of labor employed in the different
sectors of each region are constant. Further, constant nominal consumption expenditures
imply that the risk-free interest rates in North and South are equal to the rate of time
preference ρ = rN = rS .
As the variety shares are constant in steady state, the number of varieties in each category
has to grow at the same rate g ≡ n˙/n = n˙NR /nNR = n˙SF /nSF = n˙SR/nSR = n˙SC/nSC . Dividing
(1.2a) by n and using the fact that the R&D employment ratio `NR /L
N is constant in
steady state, the equilibrium growth rate is determined as
g =
gL
1− θ (1.7)
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The growth rate is finite and positive for θ < 1. However, it is independent of policy
parameters. This semi-endogenous growth implies that policy actions do not have any
effect on the long-run growth rate but the transition only.
1.4.2 Equilibrium in R&D and product markets
Free entry drives profits from monopolistic competition, (1.4), down to equal the costs of
innovations (1.3). This results in the following steady-state cost-benefit conditions
aN
nθ
=
1−α
α x¯
N
RL
ρ+ θg
(1.8a)
aSφ
nθ
=
1−α
α x¯
S
FL
ρ+ θg + i
(1.8b)
aS
nθkS
=
1−α
α x¯
S
RL
ρ+ θg
(1.8c)
All cost-benefit conditions have to be satisfied in an equilibrium in which innovation in
the North, FDI and innovation by southern firms coexist. By dividing the cost-benefit
conditions (1.8) by each other and using the relative demand quantity x¯ix¯j =
( pi
pj
)−σ
,
the equilibrium values of the relative wage, w
S
wN
, and the fraction of global innovations
originating in the South, kS , can be determined:
(
wS
wN
)σ
=
aN
aSφ
ρ+ θg
ρ+ θg + i
(1.9a)
kS =
1
φ
ρ+ θg
ρ+ θg + i
(1.9b)
Equation (1.9a) gives the relative wage necessary to ensure equal return profiles for
innovation in the North and FDI. In other words, this relation has to hold to satisfy
(1.8a) and (1.8b) simultaneously. Otherwise, investors in the North would prefer one
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sector over the other. The profitability of innovation in the North is determined by the
research efficiency aN . The profitability of FDI depends on the research efficiency aSφ
and the imitation rate i. The North will only engage in both activities if the location
disadvantage deriving from the risk of imitation and the efficiency difference is offset by
a sufficient wage gap to the South. The wage gap decreases with higher IPR protection
and a reduction of impediments to FDI.
Similarly, relation (1.9b) ensures that the cost-benefit conditions for FDI (1.8b) and
innovation by southern firms (1.8c) hold simultaneously. Otherwise, FDI drives out
southern innovation or vice versa. With higher impediments to FDI φ and imitation risk
i, FDI becomes less profitable compared to domestic innovation and can only compete if
the knowledge advantage is sufficiently large, i.e. kS is small. On the other hand, low
φ and i require a high relative knowledge of the South to avoid a crowding out by FDI
firms.12
From the definition of kS =
nSR+n
S
F+n
S
C
n = γ
S
R + γ
S
F + γ
S
C = 1− γNR and (1.9b) follows the
equilibrium share of northern innovations in all varieties
γNR = 1−
1
φ
ρ+ θg
ρ+ θg + i
(1.10)
The equation implies that the concentration of global innovation in the North is high
when incentives to invest in FDI are low (high i or φ). Whenever the South increases its
attractiveness for foreign investments, its share in innovation increases.
12The conditions have to be satisfied in equilibrium. However, i and φ have to be compatible with
labor-market clearing such that the South cannot simply set i = 0 and φ = 1 to achieve an equilibrium
with high relative wages and knowledge capital.
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1.4.3 Labor market equilibrium
Given the equilibrium conditions for R&D and product markets, the model can be solved
by solving for the labor market equilibria in North and South. To this end, equilibrium
values are substituted into the labor market clearing conditions in section 1.3.6. This
results in two steady-state conditions in two unknowns, the research intensity δ and the
share of domestic southern innovations in global R&D, γSR. δ ≡ n
1−θ
LN
is a measure for the
extent of research conducted relative to the size of the northern labor force. The term is
coined relative research difficulty in Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2011) as a high δ implies
a high global level of R&D and a small market share for each innovation. It is constant
in steady state. The equilibrium is found at the intersection of the two steady-state
conditions in the δ–γSR–plane.
For the North, the labor market clearing condition from section 1.3.6 is combined with
(1.2a), (1.8a) and the equilibrium value of γNR to get the northern steady-state condition
1 = δaN
[
1− 1
φ
ρ+ θg
ρ+ θg + i
]
∆ (1.11)
where ∆ = g + α1−α(ρ+ θg) is constant. The condition shows that labor market clearing
depends on the research efficiency in the North aN , the share of global innovations based
in the North γNR and a constant of demand and preference parameters ∆. The condition
is invariant to whether R&D in the South is conducted by FDI or domestic firms and
therefore vertical in the δ-γSR-plane. As δ is the only variable, it determines the global
equilibrium number of varieties. The share of northern labor allocated to innovation
derives from (1.2a), (1.10), (1.11) and the definition of δ, which gives `NR =
g
∆L
N , i.e.
a constant fraction of northern labor is used for innovation with the residual devoted
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to production, independent of the FDI policy or imitation rate in the South.13 Neither
distorts the cost-benefit condition for northern innovation (1.8a). Also indirect effects on
the relative wage and knowledge capital nθ do not change the allocation of labor in the
North as profits from innovation and its costs change proportionately.
From the imitation rate follows that γSC =
i
gγ
S
F ; together with (1.10) and given that the
sum of variety shares equals one, the shares of FDI varieties and domestic innovations in
the South are related by γSF =
g
g+i
(
1
φ
ρ+θg
ρ+θg+i − γSR
)
. This equation shows the interdepen-
dence of FDI and southern R&D that share the market for innovations originating in the
South. The division is influenced by model parameters and incentives to invest in FDI,
namely i and φ. Changes in these parameters change the relative size of γSF and γ
S
R as
well as their combined share.
Substituting the demand for FDI products and southern innovations from (1.8b,c), the
labor costs of innovation from (1.2b,c) and the variety shares into the southern labor
market clearing condition gives the southern steady-state condition
1 = δ
LN
LS
aS
(
−γSRφΛS(i) + ΛI(i)
)
(1.12)
where ΛS(i) and ΛI(i) are positive functions of the imitation rate i.
14 The negative
factor on γSR implies that the South supports a higher global number of varieties with a
higher domestic research share; this is due to efficiency gains from existing innovations.
The southern labor market clearing condition is thus upward sloping in the δ–γSR–plane.
13Production labor is given by `NY =
∆−g
∆
LN .
14The slope constant is given by ΛS(i) ≡ i [(ρ+θg)
2+i(ρ+θg)]α(α
−σ−1)
1−α −[g
2+ig]
(g+i)(ρ+θg)
> 0 with ∂ΛS
∂i
> 0, and the
intercept by ΛI(i) ≡ (ρ+ θg)
[
g
ρ+θg+i
+ g+α
−σi
g+i
α
1−α
]
> 0 with ∂ΛI
∂i
> 0. The results are established using
ρ+ θg > g from the household problem and α(α
−σ−1)
1−α ≥ 1.
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It has a positive δ-intercept LS(LNaSΛI)
−1. The equilibrium on the labor market is
given by the intersection of both steady-state conditions which determines the research
intensity δ and the share of southern domestic varieties γSR as shown in figure 1.1. In the
following, I assume that the equilibrium exists and satisfies 0 ≤ γSF , γSR < 1.15
0
N
S
δ
γSR
Figure 1.1: Equilibrium in the δ–γSR–plane.
1.4.4 Welfare
To make welfare predictions of policy changes, I solve for asset holdings, consumer
expenditures and the economic growth rate. The aggregate value of northern assets
AN is the product of the number of northern innovations and non-copied FDI goods
and their respective value, i.e. AN = nNR v
N
R + n
S
F v
S
F . Substituting by (1.4) yields A
N =
(γNR aNw
N + γSFφw
S)n1−θ. The southern aggregate asset value AS consists of southern
innovating firms, so that it is given by AS = nSRv
S
R = γ
S
RaSw
Sφρ+θg+iρ+θg n
1−θ. It follows
15See section 1.5.3 for details.
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that per capita asset holdings in the North aN = AN/LN and the South aS = AS/LS
are constant in equilibrium. With the budget constraint of the representative household,
e = (r−gL)a+w, the per capita consumption expenditure levels eN and eS are determined
as functions of the variety shares, wage rates and total number of varieties. Using the
variety shares, the aggregate price level is given by Pt = n
1/(1−σ)
t
(
γNR (p
N
R )
1−σ + γSF (p
S
F )
1−σ
+ γSR(p
S
R)
1−σ + γSC(p
S
C)
1−σ
)1/(1−σ)
, which decreases over time with the extent of available
varieties.
With constant nominal per capita consumption expenditure e and a decreasing aggregate
price level Pt, utility grows over time. Utility growth can be interpreted as real consump-
tion growth or economic growth. Real consumption growth in this model is given by
u˙/u = c˙/c = g/(σ − 1) ≡ gc > 0. As the steady state growth rate of real consumption
in both regions is equal and independent of the policy parameters, a long-run welfare
analysis of changes in parameter values can be simplified to the analysis of changes in cN0
and cS0 .
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1.5 Comparative statics
The role of FDI in the development of the southern R&D sector depends on the imitation
risk i which represents the strength of IPR protection for foreign firms in the South. The
second factor is the difficulty for FDI firms to innovate in the South relative to local
southern firms, expressed by the FDI policy parameter φ. The following sections discuss
changes in these parameters on the southern innovation behavior and the global level of
research represented by changes of the steady-stage conditions (1.11) and (1.12).
16This approach has been taken by Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2011). Welfare changes along the
transition path are not possible with this approach and beyond the scope of this paper.
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1.5.1 IPR protection
An increase in IPR protection in the South is represented by a decrease in the imitation
rate i. From (1.9) follows an increase in the relative wage of the South and a reduction of
the knowledge gap to the North. The variety share of northern innovations, γNR , reduces
according to (1.10). The changes in the steady-state conditions are depicted in figure 1.2.
The northern condition shifts to the right: while the North develops a smaller share of
global varieties, it does not change its innovation labor and can thus support a higher
global level of R&D. As FDI becomes more attractive, the North funds more innovations
in the South until equal return profiles for innovations in North and FDI are restored.17
0
N
S
δ
γSR
Figure 1.2: Equilibrium in the δ–γSR–plane for i ↓.
For the southern steady-state condition, the δ intercept increases and the curve rotates
counterclockwise. The complete effect derives from lower demand with higher southern
wages, changes of the extent to which global R&D is conducted in the South and the
17As I assume perfect capital markets, firms are not financially constraint and can always invest in
profitable innovations.
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(change of the) composition of southern varieties, in particular FDI and imitation goods.
More specifically, a higher relative wage in the South reduces the demand for southern
varieties of all types as their price increases relative to the overall price level. This lowers
the demand for southern production labor (demand effect). Additionally, with a lower
imitation rate i, there are less imitated FDI goods which, priced at marginal costs, have
a higher production quantity than monopolistic FDI varieties. Therefore, for a given
investment by the North, more non-imitated FDI varieties remain which require less
production labor (composition effect). This effect is limited to FDI goods and thus
stronger the higher the share of FDI in innovation in the South. On the other hand, the
South bears a higher share in global R&D in the low i regime, i.e. for the same δ, more
products will be developed and produced in the South, requiring more research labor
(innovation share effect). The demand effect together with the composition effect allow
the South to support more global varieties while the innovation share effect reduces the
support for δ. Which effects dominate depends on the share of original southern R&D,
γSR. For a low level of γ
S
R, the composition effect of FDI goods is large such that, together
with the demand effect, it outweighs the innovation share effect and allows the South
to support a higher global number of varieties (higher δ-intercept). For high γSR, the
composition effect is small and the innovation share effect dominates which reduces the
number of global varieties the South can support (counterclockwise rotation).
The overall effect of stronger IPR protection on the share of southern innovations in the
new equilibrium is not apparent and requires a direct analysis of γSR. As (1.11) fully
determines δ, it is used to substitute for δ in (1.12) to derive a formula in which γSR is
determined by model parameters only. It can be shown that the effect of higher IPR
protection on γSR in equilibrium depends on the strength of impediments to FDI φ. For
low φ up to a threshold level φ¯, γSR will increase. Above the threshold φ¯, the change
in incentives is so large that γSR decreases as γ
S
F absorbs more than the gain in global
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innovation share of the South.18 This results from a higher incentive gain for FDI firms
than for southern R&D when φ is high as the gains in knowledge capital and wage for
the South will be small. Proposition 1 summarizes the effects.
Proposition 1 When IPR protection for FDI goods is improved (i ↓), the relative
southern wage wS/wNand global innovation intensity δ increase and the innovation share
of the North γNR decreases. This raises the southern relative knowledge capital k
Sand
increases the share of global innovations developed in the South. The shares of FDI,
imitation and southern innovation change depending on the relative gain in profitability:
If impediments to FDI are below the threshold level φ¯, the wage and knowledge increases
are sufficient to support a higher γSR. If φ > φ¯, γ
S
R falls and FDI expands by more than
the additional innovation share of the South.
1.5.2 FDI policy
FDI impediments φ determine the innovation costs for FDI firms above the efficiency
parameter for the South aS . These costs can derive from additional bureaucratic and
legal obstacles for foreign firms in the South and additional initial setup costs for a
production plant or distribution network due to the unfamiliar business environment.
When the South adopts a more FDI-friendly policy (φ ↓), initial development costs
decrease (FDI cost effect) which makes investments more attractive for the North and
shifts the global innovation share to the South.19 As more innovations originate in the
18The exact threshold level of φ¯ depends on the parameters of the model. It can be shown that it lies
above φ = 1, i.e. if there are no impediments to FDI, southern research will always gain from higher IPR
protection. Details are available from the author upon request.
19Innovation in the North remains constant while innovation in the South expands such that relatively
more innovations are developed in the South.
24
South, the knowledge gap decreases which entails higher relative wages for the South. Its
lower share in global innovation shifts the northern steady-state condition outwards. For
the South, a lower φ implies that the steady-state condition rotates to the left around
the δ intercept: With a higher share in global innovation, more southern labor is used in
the R&D sectors for any research intensity δ (innovation share effect). If all innovation
in the South is in the form of FDI, the same number of global varieties as before can be
supported. This is because the change in γSF is proportionate to the change in φ and just
sufficient such that the innovation share effect, demand effect and FDI cost effect cancel
out. This leaves the δ-intercept unchanged.20 With a positive southern innovation share
γSR, the South supports a lower number of global varieties as the increase in efficiency
in innovation is not sufficient to account for the higher innovation share of the South
which causes the rotation. In the new equilibrium, fewer FDI impediments increase the
innovation share of southern domestic innovations γSR.
The overall effect on FDI is ambiguous: While lower initial costs increase FDI incentives,
higher southern wages decrease the profitability of FDI and higher relative knowledge
capital of the South increases competition by southern innovators. Depending on the
relative strength, the expansion of southern innovation potentially outweighs FDI incen-
tives such that FDI is crowded out. The equation for the relative knowledge in the South,
(1.9b), shows that the effect on kS is stronger for small φ and small i, i.e. FDI is more
likely to decrease with lower FDI impediments when FDI incentives are already relatively
strong. The equilibrium effects are shown in figure 1.3 and proposition 2 summarizes the
effects.
20This can be seen from the southern labor market clearing condition (1.12) which is independent of φ
when γSR = 0. Thus, the δ-intercept does not change with φ.
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Figure 1.3: Equilibrium in the δ–γSR–plane for φ ↓.
Proposition 2 A reduction of impediments to FDI (φ ↓) results in an increase of the
relative southern wage wS/wNand share of global innovations developed in the South
([γNR + γ
S
C + γ
S
R] ↑) which raises the southern relative knowledge capital kS. In the new
equilibrium, the share of domestic innovations in the South, γSR, and the research intensity,
δ, increase unambiguously. If the policy change happens in an already FDI-friendly
environment, the FDI share γSF can potentially fall due to stronger local competition and
the reduced wage difference.
1.5.3 Equilibria without FDI or southern R&D
The previous analysis deals with interior solutions for which the model parameters and
policy variables ensure that the steady-state conditions intersect in the δ–γSR–plane and
0 ≤ γSF , γSR < 1. No equilibrium including all sectors exists when (a) the northern
steady-state condition lies to the left of the δ-intercept of the southern condition or
(b) the intersection lies so far to the right that the cost-benefit conditions (1.8) are
not satisfied for positive variety shares for each sector, i.e. not all sectors attain equal
profitability. (a) represents the case in which the innovation share of the North is very
26
high with few innovations developed in the South. At the research intensity δ supported
by the North, the southern labor market does not clear as it requires a larger number
of varieties developed and produced in the South. For (b), the South develops a large
share of global innovations, its relative knowledge capital and relative wage are high.
The strong innovation incentives for the South crowd out FDI to violate γSF ≥ 0. The
paper only considers interior solutions.
Proposition 3 An equilibrium which exhibits northern R&D, FDI and southern-funded
innovation does not exist if (a) innovation is too low in the South to achieve a labor
market equilibrium or (b) the southern relative knowledge and wage are too high such
that the non-negativity condition of FDI is violated. Otherwise, a unique equilibrium
exists in which costs and benefits of all activities balance, each sector has a positive share
in total variety production and labor markets clear.
1.5.4 Numerical analysis
The numerical analysis of the model gives insights into the effects of policy changes on
long-run welfare. Additionally, changes of the FDI activity cannot be fully determined
analytically and are presented here.
Calibration of the model
To calibrate the model, parameters are set to match the following target moments:21
The real interest rate takes a value of 7% according to the average real US stock market
21For the sake of comparability, the target moments are calibrated as in Gustafsson and
Segerstrom (2011) and chapter 2 where applicable.
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return over the past century estimated by Mehra and Prescott (1985). This implies a
subjective discount rate ρ of the same value. Basu (1996) and Norrbin (1993) estimate a
markup of 40% over marginal costs, determining the degree of differentiation between
varieties α to be 0.714. The population growth rate gL = 1.68% represents the average
annual world population growth rate between 1960-2008 reported by the World Bank
World Development Indicators 2009 (World Bank, 2009). Only the ratio of population
sizes, LS/LN , is relevant for the steady state equilibrium. The ratio of population in low
and middle to high income countries is about 5.27 for 2008 figures (World Bank, 2009)
such that LS/LN = 5.27. To achieve a utility growth rate gc of about 2%, reflecting the
average US GDP per capita growth rate from 1950-1994 as reported in Jones (2005), I
set the value of intertemporal R&D spillovers to θ = 0.67. For the research difficulty, the
North is the efficiency benchmark with aN = 1. The southern infrastructure disadvantage
is set to aS = 2.5. With impediments to FDI of φ = 2, the research efficiency for FDI is
halved compared to southern innovators (before knowledge differences). The imitation
rate i is set to 10%. The wage rate in the North wN is one and functions as numeraire
such that wS gives the southern relative wage.
Change of IPR protection
The first simulation shows the effects of higher IPR protection in the South which reduces
the imitation rate from 10% to 5%. In table 1.1, the first column contains the benchmark
case with i = 0.1 and φ = 2. Approximately 3/4 of global innovations are developed in the
North, with the residual quarter coming in about equal parts from southern innovation
and FDI. Due to the relatively high imitation rate, 2/3 of all FDI innovations are imitated.
The South is considerably behind in available knowledge capital with about one quarter
of the knowledge available to the North. In an FDI friendly environment (φ = 2), the
effects are as expected: overall innovation increases with δ, the South achieves a higher
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global research share, knowledge capital and relative wage for the South increase. This
increases innovation incentives and reduces demand for production labor to increase both
domestic innovation and FDI. More efficient innovation and the extension of available
varieties outweigh the reduced access to imitated varieties to raise per capita utility in
both regions. The effects for the case of high FDI impediments (φ = 4) are similar.
However, changes in relative knowledge, wage and global innovation shares are smaller
and the inflow of FDI supplants domestic innovation in the South (case of φ > φ¯). Both
regions gain from the policy change although the South falls short of the utility achieved
in the FDI friendly environment.
Table 1.1: Stronger in IPR protection (i ↓)
FDI impediments φ = 2 φ = 4
Imitation rate i 0.1 0.05 0.1 0.05
R&D intensity δ 4.319 4.858 3.688 3.871
Innovation share N γNR 0.745 0.662 0.872 0.831
Innovation share S γSR 0.130 0.185 0.036 0.024
FDI share γSF 0.042 0.077 0.031 0.073
Imitation share γSC 0.083 0.075 0.061 0.072
Rel. knowledge capital S kS 0.255 0.338 0.128 0.169
Relative wage wS/wN 0.521 0.564 0.427 0.463
Utility (p.c.) N uN0 1.181 1.194 1.182 1.199
Utility (p.c.) S uS0 0.550 0.602 0.438 0.469
Numerical Result 1 With stronger IPR protection (i ↓), the expansion of total varieties
and higher efficiency in innovation outweigh utility losses from the reduced access to
imitated varieties such that utility in both regions increases. The FDI share in global
innovation goes up independently of FDI impediments. In an FDI-friendly regime, the
share of domestic innovation in the South increases. With high FDI impediments, FDI
increases at the expense of domestic innovation and utility for the South is lower.
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Change of FDI policy
The simulation in table 1.2 shows the effects of changes of FDI impediments from a
high level (φ = 4) to no impediments (φ = 1).22 Reductions of impediments to FDI
increase the global innovation output (δ ↑) with rising variety shares of the southern
region. Both relative knowledge and wage increase steadily. Despite more favorable FDI
policies, FDI investments, i.e. γSF , increase only moderately as domestic innovation in
the South, with a diminishing knowledge disadvantage and increasing wage, becomes
more competitive. For very low φ, FDI even decreases. The simulation shows that
FDI impediments as a means to foster domestic innovation by removing competition
from FDI firms is counterproductive as it suppresses the development of a competitive
local innovation sector. Only with lower FDI impediments global innovation shifts to
the South and the knowledge gap can be reduced. The gap in utility also decreases
with lower FDI impediments: While the North compensates the reduction in available
varieties with low-priced southern imitations to maintain a steady utility level (even a
slight increase) in an FDI-unfriendly regime, the South benefits strongly in utility from
lower FDI impediments.
Numerical Result 2 With lower impediments to FDI (φ ↓), global innovation, southern
relative wage and knowledge increase. Innovation in the South becomes more competitive
and steadily increases while the variety share of FDI, γSF , increases moderately and falls
close to φ = 1. Southern utility benefits strongly from the removal of FDI impediments
while the North experiences a slight reduction in utility caused by the deterioration of its
terms of trade and access to imitation.
22The case of no FDI impediments might not be feasible as FDI firms face certain costs from the
unfamiliar business environment but provides an interesting reference point.
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Table 1.2: Reduction of FDI impediments (φ ↓)
FDI policy φ 4 3 2 1
R&D intensity δ 3.688 3.876 4.319 6.567
Innovation share N γNR 0.872 0.830 0.745 0.490
Innovation share S γSR 0.036 0.061 0.130 0.496
FDI share γSF 0.031 0.037 0.042 0.005
Imitation share γSC 0.061 0.072 0.083 0.010
Rel. knowledge capital S kS 0.128 0.170 0.255 0.510
Relative wage wS/wN 0.427 0.464 0.521 0.635
Utility (p.c.) N uN0 1.182 1.182 1.181 1.172
Utility (p.c.) S uS0 0.438 0.480 0.550 0.737
1.5.5 Discussion
In the classic North-South model, the South relies completely on imitation and stronger
IPR protection reduces the availability of production blueprints for the South and access
to low-priced imitated goods for both regions without improving innovation incentives.
The introduction of FDI allows for an economic incentive to introduce stronger IPRs in the
South to attract FDI. Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2011) show that the costs of stronger
IPRs, i.e. lower imitation, are outweighed by the transfer of production via FDI. This result
relies on a strong incentive effect from increased IPR protecting which ensures increased
demand for domestic labor in the South. However, for transition economies, the effects
on the southern ability to innovate are as important as its attractiveness for FDI. The
additional knowledge transfer embodied in FDI shows that the South can further benefit
from FDI as its R&D ability improves with higher research investments in the developing
country. Nevertheless, the effect on domestic innovation in the South is ambiguous as
FDI firms compete with local innovators, a dimension absent in models without southern
innovation. While competition from FDI potentially crowds out domestic innovation, the
analysis shows that the costs of protective policy making in the South are high: Although
the South can promote domestic research with loose IPR protection when impediments
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to FDI are high, it will do so at a low and inefficient level of domestic R&D. At the
same time, welfare costs in terms of long-run utility are high. On the other hand, with
spillovers from a liberal FDI sector, southern research can much rather gain in efficiency
to reduce the dependence on FDI and imitation as the knowledge and wage gaps to
the developed North diminish. Southern long-run welfare also benefits from favorable
FDI policies: More efficient innovation extends the range of available product varieties
and outweighs utility losses from reduced access to imitation goods. The benefits from
imitation prove to be much stronger for the North that slightly loses utility when faced
with an emancipated South.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
The analysis of changes of the balanced growth path for different policy regimes shows
the complex interaction of foreign direct investments, imitation and southern innovation.
Policy makers in the South have to take into account side-effects of intellectual property
rights and FDI impediments on all activities in the South to evaluate their appropriateness
for the pursued development goals. Higher IPR protection attracts more foreign direct
investments which have a higher efficiency in innovation than local firms. As more
research in carried out in the South, its knowledge capital disadvantage is eased and
the wage gap to the North reduces. The effect on domestic innovation in the South is
ambiguous: only when FDI impediments are small sufficient knowledge capital can be
accumulated to face competition from FDI. This shows that impediments to FDI are not
suitable to support domestic innovation in the South as innovators are deprived from the
access to knowledge capital which is essential for their competitiveness.
While the model allows for a comprehensive analysis of the interdependencies of IPRs,
FDI, imitation and innovation, there are some caveats to the approach. The formulation
32
of the southern knowledge capital does not allow to distinguish between knowledge
contributions from FDI and innovation. Impediments to FDI may be more justified if
knowledge does not fully dissipate into the South when innovation is under the surveillance
of the North. Additionally, the model does not allow for production transfers of northern
innovations. This accounts for the increased R&D share in FDI but narrows the notion
of foreign investments. These issues are left for future research. Nevertheless, the current
model allows some insights into the challenges in the face of various spillover channels.
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Chapter 2
Imitation and Innovation Driven Development under
Imperfect Intellectual Property Rights∗
Abstract
Developing countries employ about two fifth of the world’s researchers, originate one
quarter of world expenditures on R&D, and their inventions are subject to imitation.
Nevertheless, the previous literature focuses on North-South setups in which the South
is restricted to imitating northern inventions. To analyze the effects of intellectual
property rights (IPR) policies on developed and developing countries we extend this
literature to allow not only for southern R&D and imitation of northern goods, but
also imitation targeted at southern innovations. We find the effects of IPRs on R&D
and welfare to be non-monotonic and dependent on R&D efficiency and an innovation
threshold in the South. For sufficiently strong IPRs the South engages in R&D and
stronger IPRs promote southern R&D, welfare, and a reduction in the North-South
wage gap. Below the R&D threshold a strengthening of IPR protection fails to promote
R&D and decreases welfare and wages. Stronger IPRs exclusively for southern firms
can benefit both regions by shifting southern resources from the imitation of northern
goods to original southern innovation.
Keywords: Innovation, Imitation, Economic Growth, Intellectual Property Rights
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Monique Newiak. I would like to thank Theo Eicher,
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2.1 Introduction
The distribution of R&D efforts between developed and developing countries is changing.
In its Science, Technology and Industry Outlook, the OECD (2008) reports that the
distribution of Gross domestic expenditures on R&D (GERD) shifts towards non-OECD
countries whose share in global R&D increased from less than 12% to over 18% from
1996 to 2005. A similar pattern arises for business R&D expenditures of profit-oriented
enterprises. In China, South Africa, Russia and India, the ratios of R&D expenditure
to GDP exceed those of high income countries like Greece and Portugal. UIS (2009)1
reports an even higher share of developing countries in world R&D for 2007: developing
countries accounted for almost 24% of world GERD and employed almost 38% of world
researchers. The extent of investments into R&D is closely correlated with the level of
domestic IPR protection. Figure 2.1 plots the Gross expenditures on R&D and GDP per
capita against the Ginarte and Park patent index in 2005.2
For the group of countries associated with low levels of IPRs (below an index of about
3 to 3.5), R&D expenditures are below 1% with low variations. Above the threshold,
there is a clear positive correlation between R&D efforts, the level of IPRs and GDP per
capita.3 Not only do the graphs show that there is a threshold level of IPRs which has to
be reached for IPRs to be positively associated with R&D, but also that IPR protection
1The UNESCO Institute for Statistics.
2Data sources: R&D expenditures for 2007 from UIS (2009), IPR index for 2005 from Park (2008a),
GDP per capita for 2007 and country codes are from United Nations Statistics Division: National
Accounts. We thank Walter Park for sharing the data on the patent index.
3For earlier periods, i.e. before TRIPS was established, the plot looks qualitatively similar, but the
data are somewhat shifted to the left, i.e. to lower levels of IPRs. See Park (2008a) for the sources of
changes in the index. The same observation is made in Ginarte and Park (1997) who find that high
income countries provide the highest level of IPR protection.
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Figure 2.1: R&D expenditures (GERD), IPRs, and GDP per capita
is positively related to income in a country only if it supports a sufficiently developed
R&D sector.4
The division of countries into industrialized innovating countries (the North) and imitating
developing countries (the South) in the theoretical literature does not account for the
increasing investments into R&D in developing economies shown by these recent surveys5
and does not allow for scenarios of a transition of imitator countries to successful
innovators as demonstrated by Asian Growth miracles like South Korea, Taiwan and
earlier Japan.
In this chapter, we develop a North-South increasing variety model which allows for
original innovation in both the North and the South, and also for the imitation of both
4That there is also a threshold level also for IPRs and growth which is dependent on the level of human
capital in a country is shown by Mohtadi and Ruediger (2010) using a threshold estimation technique.
5Important contributions with this feature include Grossman and Helpman (1991), Deardorff (1992)
and Helpman (1993) and more recently Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010). For a criticism of the lack of
southern R&D in North-South models see Park (2008b). For two examples of models in which the South
can innovate, but is not the subject of imitation itself, see (Currie et al., 1999; Glass, 2010). For firms’
private incentives to protect their intellectual property compare Eicher and Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa (2008). For
a countries decision to set the level of IPRs in a game theoretic framework see Grossman and Lai (2004).
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northern and southern inventions. We show that our model can explain the IPR-R&D
threshold level shown in figure 2.1, and determine the conditions under which IPRs can
stimulate southern innovative activity and increase welfare. We then use the model
to analyze the effects of different IPR policies in the South. For the policy analysis
the aspect of southern firms also being subject to imitation has two main advantages:
First, it allows us to analyze the effects of stronger IPRs on southern R&D incentives
directly. Second, we can examine the effects of IPRs protecting northern or southern
goods separately.
While international treaties such as the Paris and Berne Conventions prescribe the
national treatment principle, i.e. equally strong protection for domestic and foreign
innovations, this principle might not be followed by developing countries. For instance,
as Kumar (2003) describes for the case of Japan until the 1970s, IPR legislation might
be in place to unilaterally advance domestic technology adoption from abroad. Thus the
second contribution of this chapter is to analyze the effects of discriminatory southern
IPR policies on both regions.
We find that southern R&D takes place if IPRs surpass a critical threshold level. This
critical level is lower for higher southern research efficiency and a larger southern popula-
tion. This implies that large countries with efficient R&D sectors are likely to engage
in innovation even under weak IPR regimes. Likewise, to stimulate an inefficient R&D
sector in a small country, IPRs have to be very strong. In stimulating southern R&D,
the protection of northern and the protection of southern innovations are shown to work
as imperfect substitutes. If R&D takes place in the South, strengthening IPRs for both
regions’ innovators increases welfare in both regions. In contrast, an increase in IPRs
that does not surpass the threshold level fails to stimulate R&D, increases the wage gap
between the regions and decreases real consumption in the South.
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We show that a southern deviation from the national treatment principle (increasing
IPRs for domestic firms only), does not harm either region if southern R&D does not take
place, and it benefits both regions if southern R&D is conducted: By increasing R&D
incentives for southern firms, it shifts the southern attention away from the imitation of
northern goods.
The next section discusses the related literature, and section 2.3 describes the model. In
section 4, we describe the equilibrium, state the conditions under which southern R&D
takes place and analyze the effects of different IPR policies on innovative and imitative
activity and wages in the two regions. In section 5, the model is calibrated to analyze
the welfare and employment effects of stronger IPRs, and section 6 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
In this section, we compare our results to the conclusions drawn by papers which are most
closely related to our work. These papers are different from the seminal North-South
models by, i.a., Grossman and Helpman (1991), Deardorff (1992) and Helpman (1993) in
that they do not focus on the conflict between the innovating North and the imitating
South, but are more concerned with the trade-off between imitation and innovation within
the South.
In Currie et al. (1999), the South has the options to imitate the North or innovate with
knowledge dissipating gradually from the North to the southern knowledge base. While
not treating the effects of changes in IPRs explicitly, Currie et al. (1999) argue that
subsidies to the imitation sector have qualitatively the same effects as a loosening of IPRs.
The following features distinguish our model from Currie et al. and lead to partially
different results: First, we analyze the problem in a semi-endogenous framework to match
41
the empirical observations of non-scale growth as in Jones (1995). Thus policy changes
do not imply long-run changes of the growth rate in our model. Second, we include the
empirical feature of decreasing returns to R&D in imitation and innovation. This allows
the South to engage in R&D even if the wage differences between the regions are large
which is not possible in Currie et al.’s framework, but empirically more plausible. Third,
while changes in subsidies to imitation do not have any welfare implications for the case in
which the South only imitates in Currie et al. (1999), we show that in this no-innovation
case, stronger IPRs for innovations of both regions decrease welfare, but can help to
stimulate R&D if they surpass a threshold level. Finally and most importantly, we are
able to analyze discriminatory IPR policies as we allow for southern goods to be subject
to imitation as well. The protection of northern IPRs affects innovation incentives for the
South only indirectly by making the alternative (imitation) more costly. In our model,
general IPR protection has the direct benefit of increased expected profits for southern
innovators. We show that IPRs exclusively for southern goods benefit both regions if
southern R&D is present: they increase R&D profitability for the South and thus shift
resources away from imitation of the North.
Glass (2010) also analyzes imitation and innovation in the South, but focuses on how
imitation encourages R&D by providing the South with a sufficient knowledge base.
She builds a product-cycle model in which an exogenous fraction of industries has to
engage in imitation before being able to target the market for innovations and analyzes
subsidies to northern and southern R&D and imitation. IPRs are not treated explicitly
but indiscriminate subsidies to imitation and innovation are considered instead. The
result suggests that when imitation is a prerequisite to southern innovation, undirected
subsidies can increase the rate of innovation relative to imitation. However, these policies
do not have any implications for the wage rate if the South innovates, and welfare changes
are not considered in her paper. We emphasize that the focus of this chapter is different
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from Glass (2010): While she analyzes how imitation can serve as a stepping stone
to innovation, this chapter examines how the South’s choice between innovation and
imitation is influenced by different IPR policies.
Newiak (2011) analyzes how imitation can encourage R&D in countries whose innovation
sector is small compared to those in which the R&D sector is sufficiently large. The
results of her model suggest that the effect of IPR policies depend crucially on the state
of the R&D sector’s development and the main channel of knowledge accumulation in
the country. The model does not allow for imitation of southern products so that IPR
policies considered in the two papers are different: while in Newiak (2011) an increase in
IPRs always means that one source of knowledge is harder to access, we reveal a channel
through which stronger IPRs are never harmful to R&D and welfare in the South while
they can also benefit the North: stronger IPRs for southern innovations.
2.3 The Model
2.3.1 Basic setup of the model
Two regions interact in our model, a group of developed countries (the North) and a
group of developing countries (the South). Firms in North and South hire labor for
the production of consumption goods and for innovative and imitative research and
development (R&D). Labor is perfectly mobile within all sectors across one region, but
immobile between the two regions. Thus a single wage rate is paid to all workers within
one region. Trade between the two regions is costless. North and South differ in their
R&D activities. The North engages in innovation only. As long as a northern variety
has not been imitated, its production takes place in the North, and the innovating
firm charges the monopoly price on the global market. Once a northern variety has
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been imitated by the South, its production shifts to the South. The South engages in
innovation and the imitation of both northern and southern inventions. If a southern
variety has been imitated, its production stays in the South, but it is produced at lower
costs by southern imitators.
2.3.2 Households
Each region is inhabited by a fixed measure of households whose size grows exponentially
at a constant rate gL. Each member of a household is endowed with one unit of labor
which he supplies inelastically to the labor market. So the labor supply in North and
South at time t is given by `∗t = `∗0egLt and `t = `0egLt, respectively.6 Households in the
two regions are identical concerning their preferences and symmetric in their maximization
problem. We restrict the outline of the household’s problem to the South in the following.
Agents in the South maximize the discounted lifetime flow of utility
U(t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−(ρ−gL)t lnu(t)dt, u(t) =
[∫ Nt
0
xαj,tdj
] 1
α
(2.1)
arising from the consumption of Nt differentiated varieties in each period. ρ > gL is
the rate of time preference. xj,t denotes the per capita quantity demanded of variety
j and α is the degree of product differentiation so that the elasticity of substitution
between varieties is ε = 11−α . Individuals are constrained by their wage and asset income:
a˙t = (rt−gL)at+wt−et in which et stands for consumption expenditure, wt represents the
wage income and rt is the interest rate paid on asset holdings at. Solving the consumer’s
6Throughout this dissertation the convention is used to indicate quantities referring to the North by
’∗’ and to use no superscript for quantities of the South.
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maximization problem for both regions we obtain x¯j,t, the average per capita demand for
variety j by the world consumer at time t:
x¯j,t =
e¯t
Pt
(
pj,t
Pt
)−ε
(2.2)
in which e¯t represents average consumption expenditures per consumer defined as e¯t =
(e∗t `∗t + et`t)/Lt, pj,t is the price of variety j and Lt = `t + `∗t . The aggregate price index
is defined as Pt ≡
[∫ Nt
0 p
1−ε
j,t dj
] 1
1−ε
. Expenditures in the South grow at
e˙t
et
= rt − ρ such
that individual consumption expenditures et grow over time only if the market interest
rate rt exceeds the discount rate ρ.
2.3.3 Research and Development
Innovation
Varieties are invented in the North and in the South. The total amount of varieties
invented in the North is given by n∗t = n∗R,t +nCN ,t in which n
∗
R,t and nCN ,t represent the
number of not imitated and imitated varieties, respectively. Similarly, nt = nR,t + nCS ,t
is the total number of varieties invented in the South with nR,t not yet imitated and
nCS ,t already imitated innovations. The total number of varieties available to the world
consumer is then given by:7
N = n∗ + n = n∗R + nCN + nR + nCS . (2.3)
To produce a new variety, R&D firms in the North and South have to develop an
innovation blueprint. To obtain this innovation blueprint they hire researchers `∗R and `R.
7To simplify the notation we drop time scripts whenever no risk of ambiguity arises.
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The employed researchers’ productivity depends on the available amount of knowledge
capital which we model as a function of the number of already existing varieties: N θ.
We assume that it is available to both regions equally, but that the regions differ in how
efficiently they use it:
n˙∗ = n˙∗R + n˙CN =
`∗RN
θ
ag
(2.4a)
n˙ = n˙R + n˙CS =
`RN
θ
agβ
, β > 1, 0 < θ < 1, g ≡ N˙
N
. (2.4b)
We follow Jones (1995) and Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2011) in setting 0 < θ < 1
such that the R&D difficulty is decreasing in the number of blueprints, intertemporal
knowledge spillovers become weaker over time and strong scale effects are ruled out. The
parameter a captures the difficulty to innovate in the North so that β > 1 means that
the South is relatively less productive in the innovation process. Further we account for
decreasing returns to innovation by letting the global variety growth rate g ≡ N˙N enter
the innovation functions in the denominator.8
Imitation
Imitation takes place in the South only. In order to obtain the imitation blueprint of
a northern or southern innovation, imitation firms hire labor `CN and `CS and use the
existing knowledge capital N θ. In modelling imitation as a costly process we follow the
8The growth rate g in the denominator captures decreasing returns to innovation as follows: The
total number of varieties invented in period t by both regions is N˙t =
`∗RN
θ
ag
+ `RN
θ
agβ
=
Nθt
ag
(`∗R + `R/β).
Given the definition of g, this expression can be rewritten as N˙t =
(
N1+θt
a
(`∗R + `R/β)
)1/2
which implies
decreasing returns to innovation. For literature on decreasing returns to innovation, compare Griliches
et al. (1989) and Kortum (1993).
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study by Mansfield et al. (1981) who find average imitation costs of about 65% and an
imitation time requirement of 70% compared to innovation. So the imitation functions
for northern and southern products are described as:
n˙CN =
`CNN
θ
φNdaιN
, ιN =
n˙CN
n∗R
(2.5a)
n˙CS =
`CSN
θ
φSaιS
, ιS =
n˙CS
nR
. (2.5b)
φN and φS capture the difficulty of imitating northern and southern varieties and are
interpreted as the strength of IPR protection in the South. The higher φN and φS , the
stronger the level of IPR protection and the higher the costs of imitation. Note that
we allow for different IPR levels for the inventions from the two regions, so that the
South is allowed to discriminate between domestic and foreign firms. ιN and ιS are the
imitation rates of northern and southern varieties which enter the imitation functions
as in Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2011), but with an elasticity of imitation supply of
one. Including the imitation rates in the imitation functions again captures the idea of
decreasing returns to R&D9. Finally, we introduce a distance parameter d to allow for a
higher imitation difficulty for northern varieties (due to the remote original development
and production and possibly higher technological sophistication).
As they operate in the same region as the innovator, imitators of southern goods do
not have a labor cost advantage. In order to generate positive profits from imitation,
they hire process innovators who improve the production process such that the imitating
firm can produce the variety cheaper than the innovation firm. The cost advantage in
production η is a positive function of the amount of process innovators `P employed and
9Compare footnote 8.
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a negative function of the cost of developing the imitation blueprint: If it is difficult to
copy the technology in the first place, improving the production process should be also
more difficult. So η is modeled as a negative function of the labor input `CS needed to
develop the imitation blueprint: η = η¯
(
`P
`P+`CS
) 1
γ
with η ∈ [0, η¯), implying an upper
bound for the cost reduction and γ as the difficulty to improve the production process.
2.3.4 Production
Labor is the only factor of production. For northern and southern innovators, one unit
of labor produces one unit of output. As long as the invention has not been imitated,
innovators have monopoly power and maximize their profit pi
(∗)
R = (p
(∗)
R − w(∗)t )x¯(∗)R L
subject to the demand function (2.2). Monopolists in the North and South charge a
constant mark-up over their marginal costs w∗ and w, such that prices and profits for
northern and southern innovation firms are given by:
p∗R =
w∗
α
, pi∗R =
1− α
α
w∗x¯∗RL (2.6a)
pR =
w
α
, piR =
1− α
α
wx¯RL. (2.6b)
In the case of imitation, imitators and innovators compete in prices which drives the price
down to the innovator’s marginal cost of production and the innovating firm shuts down.
If the wage differential is not too high (w∗ ≤ w/α), the southern imitator charges a price
equal to the northern wage rate w∗ to force the northern innovator out of the market.
If the wage gap is high (w/α ≤ w∗), the imitator can charge the monopoly price.10 As
10These cases are referred to as the narrow-gap case and the wide-gap case by Grossman and Help-
man (1991).
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none of our results depends qualitatively on whether narrow or wide gap case is present,
we present the model for the wide gap case in the following and outline how the model
changes for the narrow-gap case in appendix 2.A. Due to the process innovation described
in the previous section, an imitator of southern innovations produces goods at lower
marginal costs (1− η)w. We assume an upper bound on this cost advantage (η ≤ 1− α)
so that the imitator charges a price equal to the southern wage rate. The price and the
profits for imitated northern and southern goods are given by:
pCN =
w
α
, piCN =
1− α
α
wx¯CNL, w
∗ ≥ w
α
(2.7a)
pCS = w, piCS = ηwx¯CSL, η ≤ 1− α. (2.7b)
2.3.5 Financial sectors
The value of an innovating or imitating firm vR or vC is given by its expected discounted
profits. As there is free entry to R&D and imitation, these expected discounted profits
have to be equal to the cost of the respective activity. For innovating firms, the cost
consists of the wage paid to the researchers. For imitating firms, it is the wage paid to
the reverse engineers (and process innovators for imitators of southern varieties). Using
(2.4) and (2.5) to determine the amount of labor for these activities, the firm values for
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innovators in North and South and imitators in the South are:
v∗R =
w∗ag
N θ
(2.8a)
vR =
wβag
N θ
(2.8b)
vCN =
wφNaιN
N θ
(2.8c)
vCS =
wφSaιS
N θ(1− (η/η¯)γ) (2.8d)
There is perfect capital mobility between innovation, imitation and production sectors
within one region, but financial autarky in North and South. Agents in the North
can decide between holding the market portfolio with a safe return r∗ or shares of the
northern innovation firms which pay a return pi∗R/v
∗
R. This return has to be adjusted by
the change in the value of the firm v˙∗R/v
∗
R and the risk of being copied n˙CN /n
∗
R. In the
South, agents have the choice between gaining the risk free rate r and holding shares of
southern innovation or imitation firms. No-arbitrage between these choices within North
and South implies:
pi∗R
v∗R
+
v˙∗R
v∗R
− n˙CN
n∗R
= r∗ (2.9a)
piR
vR
+
v˙R
vR
− n˙CS
nR
= r =
piCN
vCN
+
v˙CN
vCN
=
piCS
vCS
+
v˙CS
vCS
. (2.9b)
2.3.6 Labor markets
Finally, labor market clearing in the North and South requires that the sum of workers
employed in the R&D and production sectors equals the total labor force in each region.
In the North, labor is allocated into R&D and production: `∗ = `∗R + `
∗
Y . In the South,
labor is allocated into R&D, the imitation of northern goods, the imitation of southern
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goods, process innovation and production: ` = `R + `CN + (`CS + `P ) + `Y which, using
the innovation and imitation functions (2.4) and (2.5) implies the following two labor
market clearing conditions:
`∗ =
ag
Nθ
(n˙∗R + n˙CN ) + n
∗
Rx¯
∗
RL (2.10a)
` =
agβ
Nθ
(n˙R + n˙CS ) +
adφN ιN
Nθ
n˙CN +
aφSιS
Nθ(1− (η/η¯)γ) n˙CS
+ (nRx¯R + nCN x¯CN + (1− η)nCS x¯CS )L.
(2.10b)
2.4 The balanced growth path and the effects of intellec-
tual property rights
In this section, we define the equilibrium and analyze the conditions under which
innovation takes place in the South. We then analyze the effect of different IPR policies
for an equilibrium with southern innovation. The model without southern innovation is
described in appendix 2.B.
2.4.1 Definition of the equilibrium and long-run growth
The equilibrium is given by a set of prices, wages and interest rates in North and
South such that the allocation of labor into the different sectors, varieties and their
supply, consumption expenditures and asset holdings (1) solves the households’ utility
maximization problem and firms’ profit maximization problem and (2) labor, goods and
financial markets clear given the free market entry of firms. In this steady state equilibrium,
variety growth g ≡ N˙/N , the South-North wage ratio ω ≡ w/w∗, the imitation rates
ιN and ιS , the optimal cost advantage of southern imitative production η
?, the variety
shares ξ∗R ≡ n∗R/N , ξR ≡ nR/N , ξCN ≡ nCN /N and ξCS ≡ nCS/N = 1− ξ∗R − ξR − ξCN ,
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and the shares of labor employed in the different sectors of each region are constant.
Further, constant consumption expenditures imply that the risk-free interest rates in
North and South are equal to the rate of time preference ρ = r∗ = r.
As the variety shares are constant in equilibrium, the number of available varieties of each
type has to grow at the same rate g ≡ N˙/N = n˙∗R/n∗R = n˙R/nR = n˙CN /nCN = n˙CS/nCS .
Dividing (2.4) by N and using the fact that the R&D employment ratio `∗R/`
∗ is constant
in steady state the equilibrium growth rate is determined as
g =
gL
1− θ . (2.11)
The growth rate is finite and positive for θ < 1. This semi-endogenous growth implies
that policy actions do not have any effect on the long-run growth rate.
2.4.2 The threshold to innovation in the South
We turn now to answering the first question of this chapter: Which factors determine the
innovation threshold observed in the data (compare figure 2.1)? To answer this question,
we consider the conditions under which innovation and imitation are beneficial in the
two regions: Rearranging the no-arbitrage conditions with respect to firm values and
equating with (2.8) and realizing that v˙∗R/v
∗
R = v˙R/vR = v˙CN /vCN = v˙CS/vCS = −θg, we
arrive at four conditions balancing profits and costs of innovative and imitative activities
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in North and South:
pi∗R
ρ+ θg + ιN
=
w∗ag
N θ
(2.12a)
piR
ρ+ θg + ιS
=
wβag
N θ
(2.12b)
piCN
ρ+ θg
=
wφNdaιN
N θ
(2.12c)
piCS
ρ+ θg
=
wφSaιS
N θ(1− (η/η¯)γ) . (2.12d)
The left-hand side of (2.12) represents the benefit (the appropriately discounted profits)
from innovation and imitation, whilst the right-hand side represents the cost (wage
payments) of the respective activity.11 These conditions are crucially affected by the
level of IPRs (φS and φN ): first, they directly determine the cost of imitation (the
right-hand sides of (2.12c) and (2.12d)) and second, via their effect on the imitation
rates, they affect the expected profits from innovation (the left-hand sides of equations
(2.12a) and (2.12b)). As the South does only engage in R&D if the expected profits and
the associated costs from performing R&D are at least as attractive as the imitation of
northern varieties we thus expect three parameters to crucially influence the existence
of southern innovation: First, the higher the relative research inefficiency β the higher
the cost of developing one blueprint and the higher the required profits to cover these
costs. Second, expected profits to R&D depend negatively on the risk of being imitated
ιS which is directly determined by the level of IPRs for southern innovations φS (which
11Note that the cost advantage in the production of southern products η is determined optimally by
the southern imitation firm. To set η optimally, the marginal revenue (the increase in profits due to the
decrease in the production costs) and the marginal cost of hiring a process innovator (the wage rate) are
equated. Thus, both sides of (2.12d) are differentiated with respect to `P . The optimal cost advantage
can then be written as η? = η¯
(
1
1+γ
) 1
γ
.
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we explicitly show in the next section). Third, the decision to engage in R&D depends
on the ease of imitation of northern varieties which is influenced by the protection of
northern goods φN : the lower φN the easier is imitation compared to innovation. Finally,
the southern decisions have to be consistent with the southern resource constraint (labor
market clearing).
Combining the southern cost-benefit conditions (2.12b)-(2.12d) with the southern labor
market clearing equation, we obtain the condition under which employment in the
southern innovation sector is positive:
`
`∗
> dφN
(
ιN
g
)2( Λ1
Λ1 + ιN
)
, ιN =
β
dφN
∆1φS(ρ+ θg)g
∆1φS(ρ+ θg)− η?βg (2.13)
with Λ1 = (1 − α)g + α(ρ + θg). From (2.13) follows that the higher the protection
of northern or southern innovations (the higher φS and φN ) the more likely the South
engages in research. Intuitively, the South is, c.p., more likely to engage in R&D if
its research efficiency is high (β is low). For a given southern R&D efficiency, IPRs
for northern and southern IPRs are substitutes to a certain degree: If φN is high and
therefore the costs of imitating the North are high compared to conducting own research,
expected profits from R&D can be smaller and therefore IPRs for southern goods can
be weaker. Further, the higher the cost of original research in the South (the higher β)
the stronger IPRs have to be for northern and southern products in order to make R&D
comparatively profitable. Finally, the existence of southern R&D is more likely if the
southern labor force is large. This implies that for given levels of IPR protection and
research ability, large countries are more likely to engage in innovation. We plot the IPR
threshold (`R = 0) in figure 2.2 for illustration.
Innovation takes place for all combinations of φS and φN on the right-hand side of the
isoquant. The figure demonstrates that the South can go from a phase of solely imitating
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Figure 2.2: IPR threshold for southern research employment.
the North to a phase with own original R&D if the southern research efficiency or IPRs
are sufficiently increased. It also reveals that in order to stimulate R&D in countries
with a less efficient research sector IPR protection has to be stronger than in countries
with efficient R&D sectors. The results are summarized in
Proposition 1 (i) Stronger IPRs can stimulate southern innovation if they surpass a
threshold level. (ii) This threshold level is higher the less efficient the southern research
sector and the smaller the relative size of the southern population. (iii) The protection of
southern and northern innovations work as imperfect substitutes in encouraging southern
R&D.
If (2.13) is not satisfied, the cost-benefit conditions (2.12b) and (2.12d) do not apply and
the model collapses to the standard North-South model without southern innovation.
While we focus on the case in which southern R&D takes place in the following, we
describe the no-innovation case in appendix 2.B.
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2.4.3 Intellectual property rights policy effects on the incentives to
innovate and imitate
To obtain the rates at which northern and southern products are imitated, we combine
the cost-benefit conditions (2.12b) and (2.12d) as well as (2.12a) with (2.12d), substitute
for the profits and use the demands for varieties (2.2):
ιS =
η?β(ρ+ θg)g
∆1φS(ρ+ θg)− η?βg (2.14a)
ιN =
β
dφN
∆1φS(ρ+ θg)g
∆1φS(ρ+ θg)− η?βg , (2.14b)
with ∆1 = (1 − α)αε−1 (1+γ)γ .12 Suppose first that the South follows the national
treatment principle and chooses to protect domestic and foreign goods equally (formally:
set φN = φS = φ ). Increasing φ will then decrease the rates at which domestic and
foreign goods are imitated. However, the South could also choose to discriminate between
domestic and foreign innovators by increasing only either φN or φS . Increasing IPRs
for northern firms will decrease the rate at which northern firms are imitated, but leave
the risk of being imitated for southern innovators unaffected. In contrast, if the South
chooses to increase IPRs for domestic innovations only (φS ↑), both rates of imitation
decrease. This effect results from the impact of φS on southern innovation: If southern
goods are better protected, southern innovators face a lower risk of being imitated and
consequently their expected profits increase. This makes own innovation more attractive
compared to the imitation of both northern and southern goods which leads to the decline
of the imitation rates.
12As ιS has to be non-negative, the parameters of the model are constrained to η
?βg < φS∆1(ρ+ θg).
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In line with this reasoning, policies which aim at increasing the southern research efficiency
(decreasing β) decrease the imitation rates by decreasing the innovation costs and thus
making southern innovation more attractive compared to imitation.
Proposition 2 In an equilibrium with southern innovation, the rates at which northern
and southern innovations are imitated are decreasing in (i) an increase in IPRs for
all varieties, (ii) an increase in IPRs exclusively for southern innovations and (iii) an
increase in the southern research efficiency. Increases in IPRs exclusively for northern
goods decrease the imitation risk for northern goods, but leave the imitation rate for
southern innovations unaffected.
How do these changes of imitation risks relate to the allocation of labor into the different
sectors in North and South? We use the northern labor market clearing condition and
combine it with the cost-benefit conditions to get the amount of labor allocated into
R&D and production in the North:
`∗R =
(1− α)(g + ιN )
Λ1 + ιN
`∗ (2.15a)
`∗Y =
α(ρ+ θg + ιN )
Λ1 + ιN
`∗. (2.15b)
The amount of labor employed in the northern R&D sector is increasing in the rate at
which northern products are copied: If northern innovations are copied at a high rate, the
production of northern inventions shifts to the South quickly. As a consequence, labor
is set free from the production sector to the innovation sector. It follows that policies
which decrease the imitation risks for northern firms (φN ↑ or φS ↑ or β ↓), also decrease
the share of labor employed in the northern research sector.
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To obtain the allocation of southern labor into the imitation of northern goods, we
combine (2.15) with the imitation function for northern goods:
`CN =
φN ι
2
N
g
(1− α)
(Λ1 + ιN )
`∗. (2.16)
Using (2.14b), we can show that employment in the imitation sector for northern goods
is decreasing in the strength of IPR protection for northern and southern goods φN and
φS and increasing in the southern research inefficiency β. The higher the protection
of northern goods φN , the costlier the imitation of northern goods, so that southern
innovation and imitation of southern goods become more attractive. The higher the
protection of southern goods φS , the smaller the risk of being copied for the South,
the more attractive is southern research which shifts resources from the imitation of
northern goods to own innovation. This result again reveals that an IPR policy in favor
of domestic innovators (increase φS only) can shift resources away from the imitation of
foreign innovations.
To obtain the number of workers employed in the southern innovation sector, we use
(2.16) and the cost-benefit conditions (2.12b)-(2.12d) :
`R =
[
`− φN
(
ιN
g
)2( Λ1
Λ1 + ιN
)
`∗
]
(1− α)(g + ιS)
Λ1 + ιS +
1−α
η?
γ+1
γ
φS
β
(
ιs
g
)2
Λ2
, (2.17)
in which Λ2 = η
?g+(1−η?)(ρ+θg). Equation (2.17) consists of two terms. The number of
workers which are not employed in the imitation of northern products and their production
is given by the first factor. The second factor gives the fraction of these workers employed
in original southern R&D. Southern R&D employment is increasing in the level at which
northern and southern inventions are protected (φN and φS).
13 When protecting northern
13 A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for the latter statement is that φS <
2
∆1(ρ+θg)
.
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goods more strongly, imitation of these goods becomes more costly and thus becomes
relatively unattractive compared to innovation, thus R&D employment increases. When
protecting southern inventions more strongly, R&D employment increases for two reasons:
First, imitation of southern products becomes more costly and therefore relatively less
attractive compared to R&D. Second, southern R&D becomes more attractive as the risk
of being imitated declines. We summarize these findings in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 An increase in the level of IPRs for northern or southern goods or an
increase in the efficiency of the southern research sector (i) increases employment in the
southern research sector, (ii) decreases employment in the northern research sector and
(iii) decreases employment in the imitation sector which targets northern goods.
The effects of IPR policies on the labor allocated to the imitation of southern inventions
`CS =
φSιS
gβ
ιS
ιS+g
`R is explored in the numerical part (section 2.5).
2.4.4 Policy effects of stronger intellectual property rights on wages
and welfare
After analyzing how IPRs influence the southern incentives to innovate and imitate, we
now look at whether these changes in incentives and labor allocation are beneficial to
either of the regions. First, we look at the response of the wage differential between the
two regions as a measure of their difference in development. Second, we outline the way
we are going to measure changes in welfare due to IPR changes which will be quantified
in the numerical section. Combining the cost-benefit conditions (2.12a) and (2.12b) with
the equations for the imitation rates, we determine the relative wage between South and
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North ww∗ :
ω =
(
1
β
+
1
dφN (ρ+ θg)
− η
?
∆1φS(ρ+ θg)
) 1
ε
. (2.18)
The relative wage between South and North is determined by the southern research
inefficiency (β) and the IPRs for northern and southern goods (φN and φS). Intuitively,
the more efficient the southern research sector compared to the northern one (the lower
β), the lower the wage differential between the regions. The equilibrium wage reveals that
the protection of northern and southern goods have different effects on how far the South
is behind in terms of wages: Stronger protection of northern goods increases the wage
gap, stronger protection for domestic innovators decreases the wage gap. While both
IPR policies increase the cost of imitation, stronger protection for southern goods also
raises the profitability of southern R&D and thus southern wages. Suppose again that
the South follows the national treatment principle and protects northern and southern
innovations equally strong (φN = φS = φ). Then differentiating (2.18) with respect to φ
gives the following condition:
∂ω
∂φ
≷ 0 if ιS ≷ ιN . (2.19)
This condition says that stronger IPRs increase the southern wage rate relative to the
northern one if southern products are imitated at a higher rate, but decreases it if
northern products are subject to higher imitation. For the national treatment case
ιS > ιN is fulfilled if d >
∆1
η? . This says that stronger IPRs decrease the wage difference
between the regions only if northern products are sufficiently difficult to imitate.
60
Proposition 4 In an equilibrium with southern innovation, an increase in IPRs for
southern innovations decreases the wage gap between South and North, while stronger
IPRs for northern goods increase the wage gap. A simultaneous increase in IPRs for
northern and southern goods decreases the wage differential between the regions only if
northern innovations are sufficiently difficult to imitate.
Finally, in order to make welfare predictions for IPR policy changes, we solve for asset
holdings, consumer expenditures and the economic growth rate. The aggregate value
of northern assets A∗ is the product of the number of non-copied northern innovations
and the value of a northern innovation firm A∗ = n∗Rv
∗
R. Substituting v
∗
R by (2.8)
yields A∗ = ξ∗Rw
∗agN1−θ. The southern aggregate asset value A consists of the sum
of the values of the assets from innovating and the two kinds of imitating firms, so
that it is given by A =
(
ξRgβ + ξCNφN ιN + ξCS
1+γ
γ φSιS
)
awN1−θ. It follows that per
capita asset holdings in the North a∗ = A∗/`∗ and the South a = A/` are constant
in equilibrium. We can then use the budget constraint of the representative consumer
to determine the per capita consumption expenditure levels e∗ and e as functions
of the variety shares and wage rates. The aggregate price level is given by Pt =
N
1/(1−ε)
t
(
ξ∗R(p
∗
R)
1−ε + ξR(pR)1−ε + ξCN (pCN )
1−ε + ξCS (pCS )
1−ε)1/(1−ε). Let c∗t ≡ e∗t /Pt
and ct ≡ et/Pt denote real consumption expenditure in North and South. Following Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977), this measure also represents consumers’ utility at time t; we thus
have c
(∗)
t = u
(∗)
t . We solve for the equilibrium utilities of North and South using (2.1):
u∗t =
e∗t
Pt
≡ c∗t , ut =
et
Pt
≡ ct. (2.20)
As nominal per capita consumption expenditure e(∗) is constant in steady state, but
the aggregate price level Pt is decreasing over time, utility is growing over time. As
utility is proportional to consumption expenditure when prices are held fixed it can
be interpreted as real consumption growth. Thus the growth rate of utility can be
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interpreted as economic growth. Real consumption growth in this model is given by
u˙∗/u∗ = u˙/u = c˙∗/c∗ = c˙/c = g/(ε − 1) ≡ gc > 0. As the steady state growth rate of
real consumption in both regions is equal and independent of the policy parameters,
a long-run welfare analysis of changes in the parameters of interest on welfare can be
simplified to looking at changes in c∗0 and c0.14 As the changes in c∗0 and c0 due to changes
in IPRs are ambiguous, we leave the analysis of welfare changes in response to stronger
IPR protection and different development stages of the southern research sector for the
numerical analysis in this chapter.
2.5 Numerical analysis
2.5.1 Calibration of the model
Providing analytical results for the effects of chances in IPR protection on certain
economic outcomes proved to be unfeasible in the previous section. In this section, to
analyze the effects of changes in IPR protection on real consumption levels in both regions
and the allocation of labor into the imitation of southern innovations, we calibrate the
model with empirically sound parameters. The main aim of this section is not to get
reliable quantitative predictions of the effects of stronger IPRs, but mainly to provide a
qualitative idea about their effects on welfare, as measured in real consumption, in both
regions.
To calibrate the model, parameters are set to match the following target moments15: The
real interest rate takes a value of 7% according to the average real US stock market return
14This approach has been taken by Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2011).
15For the sake of comparability, we calibrate the target moments as in Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2011)
when applicable.
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over the past century estimated by Mehra and Prescott (1985). This implies a subjective
discount rate ρ of the same value. Basu (1996) and Norrbin (1993) estimate a markup of
40% over marginal costs, determining the degree of differentiation between varieties α to
be 0.714. The population growth rate gL = 0.0168 represents the average annual world
population growth rate of 1.68% between 1960-2008 reported by the World Bank World
Development Indicators 2009 (World Bank, 2009). Only the ratio of population size, `0/`
∗
0,
is relevant for the steady state equilibrium. Comparing population in middle-income to
high-income coutries, this ratio is given by approximately 4.35, including low-income
countries in the southern population, the ratio is about 5.27 for 2008 figures (World
Bank, 2009). Due to our general notion of the South we include low-income countries and
use a value of `0/`
∗
0 = 5.27. To achieve a utility growth rate gc of about 2%, reflecting
the average US GDP per capita growth rate from 1950-1994 as reported in Jones (2005),
we set the value of intertemporal R&D spillovers θ = 0.67. Following Gustafsson and
Segerstrom (2011), we aim for a cost advantage of imitators of the South of η? = 10%,
leading to a parameterization of η¯ = 0.18 and 1/γ = θ. As only the relative research
difficulty determines the steady state of the model, we set ag = 1 to normalize the
parameters. For the benchmark case, we assume a research inefficiency of the South
of β = 3, which implies a three times higher R&D labor requirement. The distance
parameter for imitation d is set to 10. Given those values, we set the parameters for IPR
protection to φN = φS = 1.5 which results in plausible imitation rates of about 2% of
northern innovations and 9% of southern innovations.
2.5.2 Change of intellectual property rights protection for northern
and southern innovations
The first simulation shows the effects of a general change in IPR protection in the South,
i.e. when φN = φS = φ. The fourth column contains the benchmark case with φ = 1.5
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for which the South is active in original R&D (`R > 0) and the wage differential is such
that the wide-gap case applies (ω < α). For lower values of φ up to the threshold value
of about 1, no innovation takes place in the South as R&D incentives are too weak
given the ease of imitating the North. Table 2.1 shows that the South loses from the
strengthening of IPR protection both in terms of real consumption and relative wage
until the innovation threshold is reached. This is due to the detrimental effect of IPR
protection for northern varieties. The South relies on imitation of the North to obtain
production blueprints. With higher protection, imitation employment leads to fewer
imitation blueprints. The lower marginal productivity reduces wages and leads to an
increase in production of each variety as their prices decline. Overall, employment shares
do not change in the South up to the threshold. However, fewer varieties are produced in
larger quantities for lower prices. Northern research declines slightly before and more
noticeable after the threshold is passed.
Table 2.1: Changing IPR protection for northern and southern goods
no innov. with innov.
IPR protection φS = φN 0.6 1 1.1 1.5 2.25
relative wage S/N ω 0.647 0.594 0.599 0.641 0.674
imitation rate N ιN 0.062 0.046 0.038 0.019 0.010
imitation rate S ιS 0 0 0.181 0.090 0.047
innov. labor N `∗R/`
∗ 0.214 0.205 0.201 0.185 0.176
fraction innov. labor S `R/` 0 0 0.005 0.029 0.054
fracion labor imit. N `CN /` 0.164 0.164 0.134 0.053 0.023
fraction labor imit. S `aCS/` 0 0 0.008 0.027 0.030
real cons. N c∗0 6.028 5.989 6.222 7.488 8.865
real cons. S c0 4.148 3.743 3.825 4.609 5.621
rel. cons. N/S c∗0/c0 1.453 1.600 1.627 1.625 1.577
Notes: a sum of imitators of the South and process innovators.
Figure 2.3 shows the detailed development of research employment in the South and real
consumption. The change in the labor allocation in the South is comparable to the case
in which only the protection of southern innovations is improved. However, the fall in
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imitation of the North is more pronounced as both IPR protection levels contribute to a
shift from imitation of the North to research in the South.
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Figure 2.3: Proportionate change of IPR protection.
After an initially high imitation employment and therewith imitation rate of southern
innovations, both reduce as a consequence of better protection and increased profitability
of southern original R&D compared to imitation. Surprisingly, the North does not benefit
from an increase in the protection of its goods before the threshold. This is due to the
reduction of innovation on the one side, but more importantly due to reduced supply
of lower priced imitated goods on the other side. Once the threshold is passed, both
regions experience an increase in real consumption with the South starting to catch up
in relative consumption.
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2.5.3 Change of intellectual property rights protection for southern
innovations
The simulation in table 2.2 shows the change of key variables that result from changes
of the level of IPR protection for southern innovations φS only, i.e. a deviation from
the national treatment principle. As the northern IPR protection level is unchanged,
the threshold has slightly decreased to about φS = 0.95. For lower values of φS , no
innovation takes place in the South. As only southern IPR protection is varied, changes
up to the threshold level do not affect the equilibrium. Once the threshold is passed,
innovation in the South starts and new varieties developed in the South attract imitation.
Thus labor employed in the imitation of southern goods first increases, but later declines
steadily with the rise of IPR protection. At the same time, northern products are less
frequently imitated as southern resources are shifted to innovation and imitation of the
South. As more innovations stay in the North, its R&D employment decreases slightly.
Table 2.2: Changing protection of southern goods
no innov. with innov.
IPR S innov. φS 0.75 0.95 1 1.5 1.75
relative wage S/N ω 0.555 0.555 0.563 0.641 0.660
imitation rate N ιN 0.036 0.036 0.033 0.019 0.017
imitation rate S ιS 0 0 0.237 0.090 0.069
innov. labor N `∗R/`
∗ 0.199 0.199 0.197 0.185 0.183
fraction innov. labor S `R/` 0 0 0.002 0.029 0.038
fracion labor imit. N `CN /` 0.164 0.164 0.146 0.053 0.043
fraction labor imit. S `aCS/` 0 0 0.005 0.027 0.028
real cons. N c∗0 5.927 5.927 6.047 7.488 7.954
real cons. S c0 3.433 3.433 3.507 4.609 5.007
rel. cons. N/S c∗0/c0 1.726 1.726 1.724 1.625 1.589
Notes: a sum of imitators of the South and process innovators.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the development of southern research employment and real con-
sumption in greater detail. Up to the threshold level, indicated by the gray vertical bar,
changes in φS remain without effect. Concerning the labor employment in the South,
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resources are quickly withdrawn from the imitation of the North once the threshold is
passed and shifted to southern innovation and imitation of the South. While employment
in imitating the South16 initially exceeds the research employment, original research
eventually becomes the largest research sector in the South. Real consumption expendi-
ture and therewith utility are positively affected by increases in φS above the threshold
level. The North benefits from higher returns to innovation as well as more product
varieties provided by the South which more than compensates the higher fraction of
goods supplied monopolistically. The same holds for the South, which can catch up in
relative consumption to the North.
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Figure 2.4: Change of protection of southern innovations.
16Note that `CS includes both imitators and process innovators in the graphs.
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2.5.4 Summary of main numerical results
The long-run consequences of a strengthening of IPRs for northern and southern innova-
tions in the South is welfare decreasing for the South and has negligible effects for the
North if the South does not engage in innovation. An increase in IPRs exclusively for
southern goods is shown to have no effect on any of the regions welfare outcomes if it fails
to pass the threshold level and thus fails to stimulate R&D in the South. With southern
innovation, stronger IPRs for both northern and southern goods are related to higher
welfare in both regions. Finally, a deviation of the South from the national treatment
principle by raising IPR standards exclusively for domestic firms raises welfare in both
regions by shifting the southern resources away from imitation to original innovation.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter gives a theoretical explanation for the empirically observed threshold level
in the relationship between IPRs and innovative activity. To explain this relationship, we
account for the increased R&D efforts by developing countries and extend the previous
literature to allow not only for southern R&D and imitation of northern goods, but also
for imitation of southern inventions. Further, to analyze the effects of southern IPR
policies deviating from the national treatment principle (by raising IPRs for southern
goods more strongly than for northern goods), we allow for different degrees of IPR
protection for northern and southern varieties.
We show that for low levels of IPRs and low research efficiency in the South, southern R&D
does not take place. The model therefore nests the results of ”standard” North-South
models for the no-innovation case: If IPRs are strengthened in this stage of southern
development, they do not stimulate R&D and decrease wages and welfare in the South.
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However, in accordance with the empirically observed patterns, we show that if IPRs
surpass a critical level, they help to spur innovation in the South and increase welfare in
both regions. The critical IPR level depends on the southern R&D efficiency and labor
resources such that large countries or countries with a high research efficiency engage in
R&D even under relatively weak protection. Likewise, to stimulate an inefficient R&D
sector in a small country, IPRs have to be very strong.
We show that the protection of southern and northern innovations can work as imperfect
substitutes in encouraging southern R&D though they work via different channels: While
the protection of southern innovations affects expected profits from R&D directly, stronger
protection of northern goods achieves this effect mainly by making the imitation of
northern goods more expensive. Finally, we can show that an increase of IPRs exclusively
for southern goods does not harm any region in the no-innovation case. However, if
southern R&D takes place, such a policy benefits both regions by increasing the southern
innovation incentives and thus shifting its resources away from the imitation of northern
goods.
2.A The Model in the narrow-gap case
In this section, we describe how the model in chapter 2 changes if it is solved for an
equilibrium in which the wage gap is narrow, i.e. ω ≥ α. The main change occurs through
the fact that now imitators of northern products cannot charge the monopoly price, but
charge the innovator’s marginal cost to exclude him from the market. Equation (2.7a)
becomes
pCN = w
∗, piCN = (w
∗ − w)x¯CNL. (2.7a′)
From this follows that the profits used in the cost-benefit equation (2.12c) change.
Accordingly, the equations which are derived with the help of this cost-benefit condition
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also change. These are the equations for the rate at which northern varieties are copied,
the wage gap, and the equation for the employment in the southern research sector:
ιN =
(1− ω)(ρ+ θg)g
γ
1+γ
∆1dφN (ρ+ θg)ω − (1− ω)g (2.14b
′)
ωε−1 − ωε
(
1 + (1− α)αε−1 ρ+ θg
g
dφN
)
=
γ
1 + γ
dφN
φS
η∗ − (1− α)αε−1 ρ+ θg
g
dφN
β
(2.18′)
`R =
(1− α)(g + ιS)
Λ1 + ιS +
1−α
η?
1+γ
γ
φS
β
(
ιS
g
)2
Λ2
(
`− 1− α
1− ωdφN
(
ιN
g
)2
(1− ω)g + ω(ρ+ θg)
Λ1 + ιN
)
. (2.17′)
The function f(ω) ≡ ωε−1 − ωε(1 + (1 − α)αε−1 ρ+θgg dφN ) and the constant W ≡
γ
1+γ
dφN
φS
η∗ − (1− α)αε−1 ρ+θgg dφNβ are illustrated in figure 2.5. From differentiating f(ω)
follows that df(ω)/dω < 0 if α/(1 + γ1+γ∆1dφN (ρ+ θg)) < ω. As the denominator of the
expression is greater than one the relation always holds in the narrow-gap case (α ≤ ω).
Consequently, the economy is on the downward sloping side of the wage parabola.
ω = w
S
wN1
f(ω)
W
φN ↑, φS ↑, β ↓
φN ↑
Figure 2.5: Relative wage in the narrow-gap case.
Further we know that W will be negative if the imitation rate of southern products
is non-negative (compare equation (2.14a)). Figure 2.5 also illustrates the effects of
changes in the southern innovation productivity β and the levels of IPR protection φN
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and φS . The wage gap is higher the higher the southern disadvantage in innovation β
and the lower the protection of southern goods φS : The higher β (the lower φS) the more
attractive it is to imitate. When the imitation rates ιN and ιS rise, expected profits from
innovation decline in both regions. At the same time, due to the higher imitation rates,
imitation is also more costly. As a result, the southern wage declines more strongly than
the northern one so that the wage gap increases. Applying the implicit function theorem
to the wage function, one can see that the relative wage is falling (wage gap is rising)
with stronger IPRs for northern goods φN .
While not all balanced growth path effects can be derived analytically, numerical analysis
(available from the authors) showed that the remaining effects of changes in IPRs and
research efficiency are qualitatively similar to the wide-gap case.
2.B The Model without southern innovation
This section describes the model for the case in which condition (2.13) is not satisfied
such that southern research employment `R is not positive in the general model. As
research labor cannot be negative, we set it to zero for both cases which restricts southern
activity to the imitation of the North and production. In this case, `R = `CS = `P = 0.
The only R&D functions are (2.4a) for northern innovation and (2.5a) for southern
imitation of northern goods. Likewise, the no-arbitrage conditions for southern innovation
and imitation of the South drop out. The labor market clearing condition for the South
becomes ` = `CN + `Y =
aφN ιN
Nθ
n˙CN + nCN x¯CNL.
Employment in the imitation sector `CN is still given by (2.16), but the imitation
rate in that equation is now different. Combining (2.12c) with the variety share ξ∗R
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obtained from dividing the northern R&D function by N , using ξCN = ιNξ
∗
R/g and
substituting for `∗R from (2.15) we can solve for nCN x¯CN . To solve for the imitation rate
we substitute nCN x¯CN and (2.16) in the above labor-market clearing condition.
17 The
resulting quadratic equations for wide- and narrow-gap case have each only one positive
solution which is given by:
ιN =
`
`∗
g2
2Λ1dφN
(
1 +
√
1 +
4Λ1dφN
g2
`∗
`
)
, ω ≤ α (2.21)
ιN =
`
`∗ g − Λ3
√
( ``∗ g − Λ3)2 + 4 ``∗ gΛ1(dφN (1− α) + α1−ε)
2(dφN (1− α) + α1−ε) , ω ≥ α (2.21
′)
in which Λ3 = α
1−ε(ρ + θg). The imitation rate is increasing in the relative size of
the South `/`∗ and decreasing in the level of IPR protection φN . The relative wage is
calculated as
ω =
(
ρ+ θg + ιN
ρ+ θg
g
dφN ιN
) 1
ε
, ω ≤ α (2.22)
ω =
g(ρ+ θg + ιN )α
1−ε
(1− α)(ρ+ θg)dφN ιN + g(ρ+ θg + ιN )α1−ε , ω ≥ α. (2.22
′)
As in the case with southern innovation, the relative wage between South and North is
decreasing in the strength of IPR protection for northern goods. However, compared to
the case in which southern innovation is possible, the imitation rate ιN can never be zero,
because imitation and the production of imitated goods constitute the only southern
activities. From this fact and from (2.22′) follows that ω < 1 for all parameter values.
17For the narrow-gap case, we additionally divide (2.12a) by (2.12c) to be able to substitute for the
relative wage ω.
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Consequently, the South can never catch up to the North in wages in the no-innovation
case.18
Finally, southern asset holdings change to A = ξCNdφNwaN
1−θιN ; consumption expen-
ditures are given by e =
(
1 + (ρ+ gL)
ξCN
` dφNaιNN
1−θ
)
w and the price index reduces
to P = N
1
1−ε
[
ξ∗R(p
∗
R)
1−ε + (1− ξ∗R)(pCN )1−ε
]1/(1−ε)
.
18If innovation is possible in the South, wages in the two regions can equalize if the southern research
sector catches up in efficiency. Setting ω = 1 in (2.18′) we obtain the parameter combination under which
wages are equal: ∆1(ρ+ θg)(1/β − 1) = gη?/φS . This condition says that the South can only catch up in
wages if β = 1, i.e. if research in both regions is equally efficient. As northern products are not subject to
imitation any longer in that case, equal wages require perfect IPR protection of southern innovations.
This can be achieved by letting φS →∞. Similarly β = 1 and η? = 0 lead to ω = 1.
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Chapter 3
Robust FDI determinants, Intellectual Property Rights
and Parameter Heterogeneity∗
Abstract
We examine determinants of foreign direct investments (FDI) for developing and
developed countries for a large dataset of binational FDI flows with more than 70
regressors. We particularly focus on the analysis of different intellectual property
rights (IPRs) measures to explain the intensive and extensive margins of FDI.
Using Heckit Bayesian Model Averaging we address both model uncertainty and
the selection problem inherent in FDI data. For the global sample, we find that
patent enforcement and the protection of patent rights attract FDI flows whereas
trademark protection increases the probability to invest in FDI but reduces
the volume. The separate analysis shows that (1) for developed countries, IPR
protection in the host country has a large influence on FDI flows whereas (2) IPR
protection in the source country is more relevant for investments into developing
countries. This indicates that FDI flows into developed countries contain more
sensitive knowledge capital and are more likely deterred by risks of leakages to
competitors in the host country than FDI flows into developing countries.
Keywords: FDI determinants, Intellectual Property Rights, HeckitBMA
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Theo Eicher and Monique Newiak. Walter Park and Taylor
Reynolds kindly shared their data. All remaining errors are mine.
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3.1 Introduction
The volume of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows has increased steeply in the last
decades, reaching its peak in 2007 with almost $2 trillion or 8% of OECD countries’
GDP (OECD, 2011). Looking at the sectoral distribution of FDI, 22% went into the
primary sector, 48% into manufacturing and 30% to services in 2010. Within industries,
the purpose of FDI also varies, from production to R&D; for instance, US worldwide
R&D expenditures of affiliate firms increased from $10 billion to $35 billion between 1993
and 2007 (UNCTAD, 2010). Further, FDI flows take the form of cross-border mergers
and acquisitions (M&A) or greenfield investments.
The diversity of FDI has led to the development of various theories about its motives,
determinants and consequences and inspired a large body of theoretical and empirical
studies. However, Blonigen (2005) points to the arising model uncertainty which causes
conventional regression methods to overstate the significance of estimates (Berger and
Sellke, 1987). Recent studies by Blonigen and Piger (2011) and Eicher et al. (2011a)
use Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) to juxtapose FDI theories and filter relevant
determinants. BMA allows to evaluate various FDI theories in a single estimation approach
such that the resulting estimates take account of model uncertainty (Raftery, 1995).
We extend this literature by introducing intellectual property rights (IPR) regressors
to the analysis which are, to the best of our knowledge, not considered in any previous
BMA study on FDI. The majority of theories assigns a role to IPRs in FDI decisions
as it contains a transfer of knowledge from the source company to the recipient firm.
This exposure entails a risk of knowledge dissipation that is of particular concern for
technology-intensive firms whose competitiveness primarily derives from a technological
advantage over other firms in their specific industry. Horizontal theories consider FDI
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as a form of foreign market entry in which production structures and distribution
networks are replicated abroad (Markusen, 1984). Helpman (1984) suggests vertical
FDI where technologically advanced multi-national enterprises (MNE) shift production
to regions with inexpensive input factors. When production is shifted, firms have to
protect their technology to maintain their competitive edge. Other studies highlight
the interdependencies of imitation and FDI into developing countries and find positive
effects (Gustafsson and Segerstrom, 2011) as well as negative mutual dependencies (Glass
and Saggi, 2002). Trademark protection and copyrights support trade and licensing as
alternative forms of market entry. The relevance of IPR variables has been confirmed by
empirical studies, for instance Branstetter et al. (2007), Lee and Mansfield (1996) and
Javorcik (2004b). However, these studies do not control for model uncertainty.
An additional complication in FDI studies is the often large fraction of zero observations
which potentially leads to a selection bias if only non-zero observations are considered. A
bias arises if the probability to observe an FDI flow depends on the same determinants as
the volume of FDI. To account for the selection problem, we follow Eicher et al. (2011a)
who combine the Heckman (1979) two-step estimation procedure to correct for selection
bias with BMA to handle model uncertainty simultaneously in HeckitBMA. This approach
allows for the analysis of the decision to invest, i.e. probability to observe an FDI flow,
separately from the volume of FDI.1
We use a large panel of binational FDI flows with more than 7500 observations from
1988 to 2000. The data covers 20 developed and 13 developing countries with a total of
70 regressors including the patent protection measures from Park (2008) and indicators
of copyright and trademark protection from Reynolds (2003). We find evidence for the
1This two-part decision was suggested by Razin et al. (2004) as a result from fixed costs of FDI.
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relevance of IPR variables and the presence of selection bias. For the global sample,
patent enforcement and protection from loss of patent rights promote the intensive margin
(volume) of FDI. On the other hand, better trademark protection increases the probability
of FDI but lowers the extent of FDI flows. Copyrights are not relevant for either margin.
We find some evidence for vertical FDI motives as per capita income differences increase
investment flows. Evidence for horizontal and export-platform FDI is mixed as regional
trade agreements are irrelevant for FDI with the exception of APEC. We split the sample
to consider developed and developing host countries separately and find considerable
parameter heterogeneity between both country groups with a less significant role of
patent protection in developing countries. This indicates that, compared to developing
countries, FDI flows into developed countries contain more vulnerable knowledge capital
or that the risk of imitation is more imminent for insufficient IPR protection.
3.2 Literature
FDI firms have different objectives when investing into FDI depending on whether they
invest into production, distribution or R&D. Also, whether the firm uses technology-
intensive production technologies and products or simple manufacturing goods affects
the decision making process. This section reviews the empirical and theoretical literature
on FDI, first for IPRs in particular and then in general.
3.2.1 Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment
Theoretical Studies
The basic theory of FDI can be related to the OLI framework (Dunning, 1988) in which
incentives to engage in FDI are traced back to ownership, location and internalization
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advantages. As FDI exposes firms to the risk of technology diffusion from insufficient
patent protection and imitation, internalization offers an advantage over licensing as firm-
related knowledge is kept within the company.2 However, internalization is not necessarily
complete and depends on the IPR system in the host country. For the production of
technology-intensive goods and R&D investments, IPR protection is more important
than for distribution, market access and production of non-differentiated goods.
There is no consensus on the effects of IPRs on FDI in the theoretical literature. In
Maskus et al. (2003), stronger IPR protection is represented by an increase in imitation
costs that encourages foreign firms to invest into FDI and licensing. However, they find
that the relative effects of stronger protection on licensing and FDI depend on technology:
While FDI is replaced by licensing in high-innovation sectors, firms in lower-technology
industries are more likely to shift from licensing to FDI as the rate of imitation in
low-technology sectors is less sensitive to the level of IPR protection.
North-South models analyze FDI flows from developed to developing countries in a setup
where technologically advanced countries (the North) are innovative with high domestic
labor costs whereas developing countries (the South) either are not innovative at all or
are less efficient in innovation. Northern firms are deterred from investments in the South
by the risk of imitation due to insufficient IPR protection. In such a framework, Glass
and Saggi (2002) find that if imitation in developing countries is directed towards patents
of MNE (multi-national enterprises) in both regions and stronger IPR protection affects
the risk of imitation proportionately, then stricter IPRs do not increase FDI but lead to
a resource waste for imitators. Glass and Saggi (1998) argue that the deterring effect of
imitation only applies to low-technology goods as only those are targeted by imitation.
2For a discussion of the OLI framework see Markusen (1995).
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Contrary to these results, Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2011) restrict the South to imitate
FDI goods transferred from the North to the South and find that FDI flows into the
South increase unambiguously with higher IPR protection.3 Chapter 1 (Lorenczik, 2011)
allows for an innovative South that benefits from the knowledge spillovers from FDI.
When IPR protection expands, FDI and southern R&D become more attractive such that
the total effect on FDI depends on the level of southern development and the accessibility
of the South for FDI.
Empirical Studies
Empirical studies also show ambiguous effects of stronger IPR protection. Nunnenkamp
and Spatz (2004) use the aggregate Ginarte and Park (1997) index of patent protection
and an alternative index by the World Economic Forum and find that stronger IPR
protection increases the volume and technology level of FDI. Branstetter et al. (2007)
look at IPR policy changes and find that subsequent FDI from developed to developing
countries increases where technology-intensive MNE account for a larger increase than
less technology-intensive firms. Lee and Mansfield (1996) find that with low levels of IPR
protection in host countries, US FDI into developing countries is mainly directed to sales,
distribution and simple manufacturing. Similarly for Eastern European and former Soviet
countries, Javorcik (2004a) reports that more technology-intensive firms are deterred
from FDI by low IPR protection and invest in distribution rather than production.
Smith (2001) analyzes the joint effects of stronger IPR protection in host countries on
US exports, affiliate sales and licensing. She finds that stronger IPR protection increases
foreign affiliate sales and licensing in particular in countries with a strong imitative
3A very similar theoretical model is used in Branstetter et al. (2007).
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capability. Also, higher IPRs increase the flow of knowledge to affiliate firms relative
to other factor flows. Kumar (2001) studies the determinants of FDI directed to R&D
activities in developing and developed host countries but does not find evidence for an
impact of IPRs.
The risk of knowledge diffusion associated with FDI has been studied in connection with
spillover effects from FDI.4 For host countries, these effects can be a desired side-effect
to support knowledge accumulation but are generally negative for FDI firms.5 Empirical
studies of horizontal spillover effects from FDI, i.e. whether the presence of foreign
firms raises productivity of competitors in the host country, are often inconclusive.6
Vertical linkages refer to knowledge transfers from MNE to upstream and downstream
firms. Javorcik (2004b) notes that the lack of within-industry productivity effects might
result from efficient internalization of knowledge transfers. However, vertical spillovers
to upstream and downstream firms may be accepted by FDI firms that benefit from
productivity gains by suppliers (upstream) and provide more productive input factors
to customers (downstream). Javorcik uses firm-level data from Lithuania and finds
evidence for positive spillover effects through backward linkages, i.e. to suppliers of
FDI firms. This effect is limited, however, to subsidiaries in joint foreign and domestic
ownership, not fully foreign-owned firms. Vertical upstream spillovers are also found
by Kugler (2006), Bwalya (2006) and Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008).7 Branstetter
4Smeets (2008) surveys this literature. He distinguishes between knowledge transfer as a purposeful
diffusion of knowledge between firms and knowledge spillovers used by firms other than the firm that
created the knowledge without an adequate compensation. For the purpose of this literature outline, we
use the terms interchangeably.
5Romer (1993) notes that FDI can serve as a means to reduce the idea gap of developing economies
towards developed countries.
6For instance, Aitken and Harrison (1999) find positive productivity effects of foreign investments for
Venezuelan plant only for small plants and negative effects for domestic plants in the same sectors. An
overview over the literature is given in Go¨rg and Greenaway (2004).
7Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) also find evidence for horizontal spillovers facilitated by joint projects;
see also Blalock and Gertler (2008).
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et al. (2006) analyze the effect of IPR reforms on US multinational firms and find a
strong impact on technology transfers: R&D expenditures of affiliate firms and patent
applications increase. In particular affiliates that made use of US patents already prior
to reforms expand the use markedly under a stronger IPR regime.
Markusen and Trofimenko (2009) distinguish two channels of worker spillovers associated
with FDI: learning by employees in foreign firms incurs lower costs than in domestic firms
and offers access to new skills not available to domestic firms. For Colombian plant-level
data, they show that the hiring of workers previously employed by multinationals signifi-
cantly increases wages and productivity in domestic firms. Go¨rg and Strobl (2005) find
that if entrepreneurs previously worked for a multinational, their own firms have a higher
productivity if it operates in the same industry. Hale and Long (2006) conduct a similar
study for Chinese cities and find FDI spillovers through high-skilled worker movements
for technologically advanced firms in the same city and industry. Demonstration effects
from FDI result from imitation of foreign affiliates by local firms and as such occur
within the same industry. Cheung and Lin (2004) analyze the effect of FDI on patent
applications for inventions, utility models and external designs and find the strongest
impact on external designs which is easiest to adopt from demonstration and adequate
to the low level of technological development in China. Contrary to vertical spillovers,
diffusion from worker mobility and demonstration are unintended leakages for FDI firms.
3.2.2 FDI motives
Markusen (1984) introduced market access in foreign countries as a motive for FDI as a
result of trade frictions. In this class of models, MNE disperse into different countries
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where the whole production and distribution process is replicated (horizontal FDI).8
An extension of this motive is given by export-platform models in which FDI provides
access not only to the host country of FDI but also to other countries in the proximity
of the host (see Blonigen et al., 2007 and Ekholm et al., 2007). This idea was already
developed in Motta and Norman (1996) who find that FDI is more concentrated when
trade barriers are lower as the whole region can then be served from a single FDI host.
On the other hand, Helpman (1984) suggests that FDI is attracted by production cost
advantages in the host country (vertical FDI). In both vertical and horizontal FDI,
technologically advanced firms seek to exploit their technological advantage over local
firms in the host country (technology-exploiting FDI). Markusen and Maskus (2002)
combine both horizontal and vertical FDI models into a knowledge-capital model in
which MNE are exporters of knowledge-based services; their empirical analysis supports
the horizontal model and rejects the vertical model.9
Investment into FDI can also be directed to the acquisition of knowledge and technology
from the host country (technology-seeking FDI) (Fosfuri and Motta, 1999, Bas and
Sierra, 2002). For technology-exploiting FDI, stronger IPR protection is likely to attract
FDI whereas the benefits for technology-seeking firms are inversely related to the strength
of IPRs. Therefore, depending on which motive dominates, firms may prefer weaker IPR
protection to take advantage from spillovers in the foreign country.
Recent studies that highlight model uncertainty for FDI are Blonigen and Piger (2011)
and Eicher et al. (2011a) who use BMA to filter robust determinants of FDI flows. Eicher
8Markusen (1995) reviews horizontal FDI and affirms that industries whose ownership advantages
consists of intangible assets such as human capital, patents and technological knowledge appreciate the
internalization aspect of FDI.
9Knowledge-based services are managerial and engineering services, financial services, reputations
and trademarks. A detailed motivation and description of the knowledge-capital model is given in
Markusen (2004). A review of FDI theories is available in Saggi (2002).
84
et al. find mixed support for FDI theories: regional trade agreements and currency unions
as indicators of horizontal FDI and export-platform theories are only robust for specific
instances while market potential10 has a negative effect on FDI. Vertical theories are not
supported by their results as economic development is positively related to FDI flows.
Instead, productivity, taxes and cultural similarities affect FDI flows.
3.3 Empirical Methodology
The empirical strategy follows Eicher et al. (2011a) for the estimation of HeckitBMA
coefficients. This approach avoids problems of model uncertainty and selection bias which
arise from the large number of candidate regressors suggested in the theory of FDI and
the problem of zero or missing observations in FDI data sets. Eicher et al. (2011a) show
that HeckitBMA suggests much more parsimonious models than Heckit alone. The most
widely used approach to the estimation of FDI flows are gravity models in analogy to
the estimation of trade flows (see Blonigen, 2005) with theoretical motivation for the
application to FDI provided by Bergstrand and Egger (2007).11 We employ the following
gravity equation for our estimations
Yijt = α0 +
t1−1∑
t=t0
αtdt + β1logGDPit + β2logGDPjt + β3logDij + β4Xijt + εijt (3.1)
The gravity equation suggests that the log of binational FDI flows at time t, Yijt, depends
positively on the market sizes of the source country j, GDPjt, and host country i, GDPit,
10The potential of a country to function as an export platform, measured by surrounding countries’
market size weighted by the distance to these countries.
11Other studies applying a gravity equation include, among others, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) and
Mutti and Grubert (2004).
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and negatively on the distance between the two countries, Dij . A number of additional
variables Xijt is included in the regression to account for additional determinants derived
from the theory of FDI flows. Year dummies denoted by dt are used to capture aggregate
shocks and to avoid spurious regression problems that can arise from the use of a common
deflator for FDI flows.
The problem of estimating the determinants of FDI is that the data contains a large
number of missing observations which, if not properly handled, leads to a selection
bias that is in principle an omitted variable bias.12 The selection problem stems from
underlying, unmeasured factors that influence both whether an observation is made and
the volume of FDI if the observation is available. This introduces a bias to simple OLS
regressions on FDI flows. Instead, a system of regression equations is applied which
models a selection equation to estimate determinants of the probability of an observation
and an outcome equation to estimate the determinants of the size of an observation.
FDI as a two-part decision, i.e. that the decision to invest into FDI is separate from the
magnitude of the investment, is suggested by Razin et al. (2004) and derives from fixed
costs involved with FDI. The system of equations is given by13
Z∗ =Wγ + u, (3.2a)
Y =Xβ + ε (3.2b)
where Z∗ is a latent variable that determines whether an FDI flow Y is observed according
to the observation rule Y = Z∗ if Z∗ > 0 and Y = 0 otherwise. Whether an observation
is made or, put differently, whether firms in the source country decide to invest, depends
12As no country pair observations are explicitly excluded from the sample, the selection problem is
referred to as incidental truncation. The following description is based on Greene (2003).
13Subscripts are omitted for brevity whenever no risk of ambiguity arises.
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on a set of regressors W which may have covariates in common with the regressors
in the outcome equation, X. The selection bias arises unless (a) unobserved country
characteristics that influence the selection equation are uncorrelated with the outcome
equation or (b) every determinant influencing the selection equation is controlled for in
the outcome equation.14
Under the assumption that u, ε follow a bivariate normal distribution, the regression
model (3.2) can be restated using the properties of incidentally truncated bivariate normal
distributions. The latent variable Z∗ is replaced by the binary variable Z which takes a
value of 1 if an observation is made and 0 otherwise. The system of equations is then
given by15
Pr(Z = 1|W ) = Φ(Wγ) (3.3a)
Y = Xβ + ε, observed only if Z=1 (3.3b)
where (u, ε) ∼ N [0, 0, 1, σε, ρ]
The estimation follows a two-step procedure suggested by Heckman (1979) where in the
first step the selection equation is estimated by a Probit regression to obtain estimates of
γ. For each observation for which FDI flows are observed, the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR)
is calculated as λˆ(Wγˆ) = φ(Wγˆ)/Φ(Wγˆ), i.e. ratio of the probability density function
and cumulative distribution function evaluated at the fitted values of the first stage
regression. In the second step, an OLS regression of Y , which contains only observed
FDI flows, on a set of regressors X including the IMR is used to estimate the coefficients
14The bias results from a non-zero correlation of the error terms in the outcome equation and the
selection equation. As a result, the error term of the outcome equation will not have mean zero and will
be correlated with the regressors (Heckman, 1976).
15The variance of u can be simplified to 1 without loss of generality (Wooldridge, 2002).
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βˆ. The coefficient on the IMR, βˆλ, indicates whether a selection bias is present in the
sample: If βˆλ is significant, an OLS regression on the outcome equation (3.2b) without
the IMR leads to biased β-estimates.16 First stage and second stage regressors can share
common variables; however, at least one exclusion restriction is necessary to facilitate
identification.17
The Heckit estimation deals with the selection bias to give consistent estimates for
selection and outcome equations. However, there is a large number of regressors of which
subsets have been motivated by the literature on FDI. We take account of this model
uncertainty by applying Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) to the Heckit approach to
filter relevant regressors. The idea is to (I) estimate the first stage selection equation
(3.3a) with BMA, (II) average over fitted values to calculate the IMR for each observation
which is added to the vector of second stage regressors and (III) apply linear regression
BMA to all observed FDI flows to estimate (3.3b). We follow Eicher et al. (2011a) who
implement BMA for the Heckit procedure to get a HeckitBMA estimation and only
outline the main steps here, exemplary for stage 1: From all possible subsets of regressors
W1, ...,Wq, regression models M1, ...,MK are constructed. BMA then calculates the
posterior distribution of the regression coefficients γ given the data, i.e. the means
and variances of the estimates, as a weighted average of the distributions of regression
coefficients from regressions on all possible models Mk. The model weights depend on the
model probabilities which are based on the goodness of fit of the individual models and
their prior probabilities. The calculation of coefficient variances is based on an average
of coefficient variances in each model and the variance of coefficient estimates across
16Greene (1981) establishes that the bias can be upwards or downwards.
17If the sets of first stage and second stage regressors are identical, the IMR can be highly collinear to
the regressors such that the second stage estimation becomes very imprecise (see Leung and Yu, 1996
and Puhani, 2000).
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models.18 In both stages of HeckitBMA we use uniform priors for all models and unit
information priors for parameters.19
Finally, the inclusion probabilities of the coefficients are derived as the sum of model
probabilities of models that contain the coefficient. Posterior inclusion probabilities
indicate the relevance of parameters where inclusion probabilities of less than 50% are
considered as evidence against an effect; higher probabilities up to 75%, 95%, 99% or
larger show weak, positive, strong or decisive evidence for an effect.20 No inclusion
probability for the coefficient on the IMR, βλ, is calculated as it is included in all
regressions. The BMA coefficients obtained in the first and second stage are consistent
and robust to selection bias.21
3.4 Candidate Regressors
The number of different theories on FDI gives rise to a multitude of candidate regressors.
The following section gives an overview over the covariates in our estimations and their
anchorage in the previous literature.22 Bergstrand and Egger (2007) introduce physical
capital and a third country ’rest of the world’ to the model of FDI to show that intra-
industry trade and intra-industry FDI can function as complements and supply a rational
18For a survey of BMA and a detailed mathematical exposition see Raftery (1995). BMA as part of a
two-stage estimation procedure is discussed in Viallefont et al. (2001).
19The unit information prior (UIP) is based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). Eicher
et al. (2011b) evaluate different prior choices and find UIP to outperform other priors.
20This categorization was first suggested by Jeffreys (1961) and later refined by Kass and Raftery (1995).
21Due to computational restrictions, we use the mode oriented stochastic search (MOSS) algorithm
developed by Dobra and Massam (2010) and Lenkoski and Dobra (2011) to search the model space. We
use different starting points to obtain consistent results.
22The issue of endogeneity arises for a number of regressors. However, the problem is not addressed
in this paper and left for future research. For references to studies tackling endogeneity and model
uncertainty in FDI regressions see Eicher et al. (2011a), FN 13.
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for the use of gravity models. Accordingly, distance and market sizes of source and host
countries are used as regressors. Eicher et al. (2011a) aggregate previous studies and find
that these regressors receive overwhelming support in the data.
We use separate indices to capture the effects of IPR protection. The strengths of patent
enforcement and lack of restrictions on patent rights represent the actual effectiveness of
patent protection in a country while membership in international patent treaties may not
be closely related to the de factor level of protection. Coverage is important as countries
might specifically exclude sectors from their patent laws. For instance, Kumar (2003)
describes how Japan excluded chemicals and pharmaceuticals from the patent system
to facilitate knowledge absorption by domestic firms until the 1970s. Trademarks and
copyrights, on the other hand, are directed to the protection of trade rather than FDI
and may account for substitution effects when the internalization motive of FDI becomes
less important.
We use a number of economic and cultural variables that are commonly included in FDI
regressions. Common Borders, language and colonial relationships account for historical
ties and cultural proximity between countries and are often found to exhibit a positive
influence on FDI flows.23 In its Investing Across Borders 2010 report the World Bank
constitutes that better FDI environments are associated with better governance, higher
institutional quality, lower political risk and less corruption (World Bank, 2010). We use
a number of country risk indicators to capture these factors.24
23See Eicher et al. (2011a) for a meta study of the empirical FDI literature.
24We include measures of democracy, government stability, internal and external conflict, religious
and ethnic tension, presence of the military in politics, bureaucracy, rule of law and socio-economic
development as measures of governance and political risk.
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Real exchange rates determine the effective costs of assets and input factors in host
countries. Blonigen (1997) analyzes FDI flows generated from the acquisition of firm-
specific assets and finds that a depreciation supports inflow FDI as asset prices for foreign
firms decrease relative to domestic firms. Froot and Stein (1991) motivate exchange rate
effects with global capital market imperfections. While both find empirical support for the
influence of exchange rates on FDI, other studies find no clear effects (Di Giovanni, 2005,
Blonigen and Piger, 2011).
If export-platform FDI is the dominant motivation for investments, membership in
regional trade agreements (RTA) by host countries increases incentives for FDI from
outside the RTA as the potential of member countries to function as export-platforms
increases. At the same time, an RTA can lead to a reallocation of FDI flows to a single
export-platform within an RTA. This effect has been shown by Jaumotte (2004) for
developing countries where FDI flows were shifted towards more developed and more
stable countries within an RTA. Blomstro¨m and Kokko (1997) support export-platform
motives for the bilateral trade agreement between the US and Canada where FDI within
the RTA decreased while Canada received more FDI from third countries. For the
European Union, Baltagi et al. (2008) find that membership leads to a divergence of FDI
flows to member countries. We include all available RTA and currency unions individually
to separate effects between them (see Eicher et al., 2010). A similar reasoning applies to
horizontal FDI motives, amplified by tariff-jumping motives (Blonigen, 2002). Wei (2000)
finds that tax rates on multinational firms in host countries lead to a reduction of
inward FDI. Razin and Sadka (2006) analyze the effects of host and source taxes for a
two-fold FDI decision for intensive and extensive margins of FDI and find that host taxes
negatively affect the extent of FDI as well as the likelihood to invest. Source taxes are
irrelevant for the magnitude of FDI but increase the likelihood to invest. Their empirical
results largely support the theoretical predictions.
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Depending on the motive for FDI, productivity can have different effects: If FDI is
vertical, i.e. conducted to exploit technological advantages, higher productivity indicates
potentially lower incentives as local competition is strong. On the other hand, if FDI is
technology-seeking, high productivity indicates the potential to acquire knowledge from
the host country. Razin et al. (2008) and Razin et al. (2004) assert that when positive
productivity shocks occur in host countries, the volume of FDI flows is extended due to
an increase in marginal profitability. At the same time, in the presence of setup costs,
the likelihood to start an investment decreases.
Educational differences between host and source country of FDI can be an incentive
for vertical FDI as they indicate the availability of cheap production labor and the
opportunity to exploit technology advantages. This is also implied by the knowledge-
capital model of FDI in which countries with scarce supply of labor profit greatly from an
inflow of knowledge via FDI to utilize other factors of production (Markusen, 1997 and
Markusen et al., 1996). Razin et al. (2004) find positive effects of education on FDI flows
for both host and source countries, giving support to vertical and knowledge-seeking FDI
motives.
Financial risks have been shown to direct investments into more secure economies. Razin
et al. (2004) find that high financial security allows host countries to attract inward
FDI flows while outflows are crowded out. Other economic variables are GDP growth,
GDP per capita and the investment profile. GDP growth indicates favorable investment
opportunities and returns to investment. In a model of corporate control, Head and
Ries (2008) suggest that GDP per capita indicates higher ability on the source side
of FDI which makes investments more profitable. As a measure of capital abundance,
high GDP per capita indicates arbitrage opportunities between capital-abundant and
labor-abundant countries (Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004).
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3.5 Data
Our data set is based on Eicher et al. (2011a) which we combine with data on intellectual
property rights obtained from Park (2008) and Reynolds (2003). See table 3.3 for
an overview over the data variables and sources. The updated Ginarte-Park index
measures patent protection and distinguishes between patent coverage, membership
in international treaties, duration, enforcement mechanisms and restrictions on patent
rights, i.e. protection from loss of patent rights25. Each category is evaluated using a
number of criteria which add up to a final score between zero for no protection and
one for full protection. Out of all measures, enforcement shows the highest standard
deviation between countries while protection from loss of rights is weakest on average. All
measures show considerable variation with the exception of duration which is high for all
regions, reflecting that patent rights are formally in place in all countries. Copyright and
trademark data are obtained from Reynolds (2003). The trademark index determines
the strength of protection based on coverage, procedures, i.e. enforcement and penalty
mechanisms, and treaties. The copyright index aggregates scores on coverage, usage,
enforcement and treaties. Both measures relate to the protection of traded goods rather
than patents and capture the risk of counterfeiting. Variables for political investment
risks are taken from the International Country Risk Guides 1985-2000. These measures
are constructed such that higher values indicate more favorable conditions.
After combining the data by Eicher et al. (2011a) with the measures of IPRs, our
unbalanced panel covers annual bilateral FDI flows from 1988 to 2000 with a total of
25Restrictions on patent rights is divided into (the absence of) working requirements (requirement
to utilize the patented innovation), compulsory licensing and revocation of patents. We use the term
protection from loss of rights in the result tables and subsequent sections.
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7586 observations out of which 46% are non-zero. Zero observations occur relatively
more often for developing countries. The dataset covers FDI flows for 20 developed
(high-income) and 13 developing countries.26 Table 3.2 details frequencies of observations
for host and source countries. A lag FDI dummy is used as exclusion restriction where a
positive coefficient indicates threshold barriers for FDI which are lower for country pairs
with previous FDI flows (Razin et al., 2008).
3.6 Empirical results
3.6.1 FDI Determinants for the global sample
We first compare our results for the global sample to Eicher et al. (2011a) in table 3.4
(see appendix). The first two sets of columns show our results for the intensive margin
(volume of FDI) and the extensive margin (decision to invest in FDI) for the regression
system (3.3). The last two sets of columns show the equivalent results from Eicher
et al. (2011a). The IMR shows evidence for the presence of a selection effect and the
exclusion restriction is highly relevant for the first stage regression which ensures that
selection effects are corrected for and precise estimates are obtained. For the volume of
trade (second stage), we find 31 variables with evidence for an influence on FDI flows
(inclusion probability >50%), most of which exhibit positive or strong evidence. Out
of these regressors, patent duration, enforcement and protection from loss of rights are
relevant in host and source countries; trademarks are relevant in the host of FDI only.
26High-income countries according to the World Bank are categorized as developed countries and
middle- and low-income countries as developing countries. This gives the same country groups as the
International Monetary Fund’s distinction which the exception of Poland.
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These results compare to 23 vital regressors in Eicher et al. with an overlap of 17 variables,
i.e. most additions to the set of relevant determinants are newly added IPR variables.27
Overlapping parameters are generally of the same sign and similar in magnitude; we see
this as a confirmation of our results and the robustness of the HeckitBMA approach. The
only exception is per capita income in host which shows a negative effect on the volume
of FDI in our sample but is positive for Eicher et al..
From the newly added IPR variables, patent enforcement and protection from loss of
rights show strong evidence for a positive impact on FDI volumes for host and source
countries. Both criteria are likely the most important for investors as they reflect the
effectiveness of patent protection. The positive influence of higher protection confirms
the internalization purpose of FDI and the sensitivity of technology-exploiting FDI to
patent rights. Patent duration is negative for host and source and might indicate a
deterring effect for technology-seeking FDI. On the other hand, membership in patent
treaties and coverage are not relevant for the volume of FDI. The lack of importance
of membership might reflect the irrelevance of de jure protection compared to de facto
protection captured by the other criteria. Out of the other IPR measures, only trademarks
in the host country are relevant; their negative effect on the volume of FDI points to a
substitution effect between FDI and trade.
The gravity regressors distance and market size have the expected impact on FDI as does
cultural proximity represented by colonial ties and common language. Further country
characteristics that positively influence binational FDI flows are the lack of corruption
and low tax rates in host and source; fewer internal conflicts in host promote FDI inflows
as does a higher productivity; internal conflicts increase the outflow of FDI. Other risks in
27Our dataset does not include a market potential variable suggested by export-platform theories.
Although relevant in Eicher et al. (2011a), it is of the opposite than expected sign.
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host countries determine FDI inflows but are irrelevant for the source side: the absence of
religious tension, good socio-economic development, democracy and government stability
advocate inflows. Unexpectedly, a better investment profile reduces FDI inflows. On the
source side, higher bureaucratic quality promotes investments abroad. Regional trade
agreements, with the exception of APEC, show no influence; the coefficient on bilateral
trade agreements displays decisive evidence for an FDI enhancing effect. A higher real
exchange rate in host countries lowers FDI volumes as expected. Estimates for per capita
income indicate that FDI flows from capital-abundant into capital-scarce countries.
For the decision to invest in FDI (extensive margin, first stage), our results differ
considerably from Eicher et al. (2011a). From 15 relevant variables in our results, only
ethnic tension and tax in the host country show evidence in both studies. We find
decisive evidence that all gravity variables matter for the investment decision while
they are irrelevant in Eicher et al. Concerning intellectual property rights, only patent
enforcement in the source country and trademarks are relevant while the results show
evidence against patent duration, coverage, membership and copyrights for both ends of
binational FDI and patent enforcement in host. With stronger trademark protection,
the number of countries that receive FDI flows increases. Together with the lower FDI
volumes detected in the second stage, this may represent a shift from production FDI to
distribution oriented FDI which requires lower investments per host country. Good patent
enforcement in the source country can be considered as a prerequisite for distributional
FDI and has a positive influence on the likelihood of investments.
Colonial ties, lower corruption in source and lower taxes in host make FDI more likely.
The negative effect of productivity in host supports the vertical theories of FDI. A
common border reduces the propensity to invest in a foreign country, which supports
export-platform and horizontal FDI theories as the market can already be served by
96
trade relatively easily. While irrelevant once a foreign market is entered, ethnic tension
shows to deter FDI from the outset.
Relating our results to the theory of FDI, we find some support for individual theories
while others are partially rejected. Razin and Sadka’s (2006) conjecture of a decreasing
likelihood and magnitude of FDI with higher host taxes is confirmed, but source taxes
reduce the volume of FDI, not the likelihood. Razin et al. (2008) predict increasing
volumes of FDI but a lower likelihood to invest with higher host productivity levels, which
is confirmed by our results. Between vertical and horizontal FDI motives, the results are
mixed. Horizontal FDI motives are expected to rise with the introduction of regional trade
agreements as they offer better distribution opportunities in the host market. We find
only APEC to show such an effect on the volume of FDI. Stronger trademark protection
in host countries increases the probability to invest but decrease the volume which
indicates low-volume distribution FDI rather than a transfer of production. Vertical FDI
motives are supported by the negative effect of per capital income in host and positive
effect for source countries: development differences increase the volume of FDI (Egger
and Pfaffermayr, 2004). The irrelevance of educational differences stands against the
knowledge-capital model. The decisive evidence for a positive effect of patent protection
supports vertical and technology-exploiting FDI motives. Patent duration reduces the
volume of FDI, not the likelihood. This effect may be related to knowledge-seeking
motives that are restrained by long protection periods.
Overall, the high inclusion probabilities of IPR protection variables show the relevance for
FDI decisions and lend support to the theory. Previously used second stage parameters
are only slightly affected. For the first stage, the results are sensitive to the new regressors
and change markedly. Compared to Eicher et al. (2011a), our results support the gravity
variables and the inclusion of IPR measures whereas Eicher et al. find more support for
country risk characteristics as determinants of the first stage decision.
97
3.6.2 Developing and developed country effects
In this section, we split the sample into FDI flows that go into developing countries
and those that go into developed countries to analyze differences in the effects of IPR
protection. Table 3.1 shows the results for IPR measures; the first two sets of columns
show the results for developed countries and the last sets of columns refer to developing
countries. Variables with inclusion probabilities larger than 50% in the global sample are
shaded. The second stage results for developed countries are quite similar to the global
sample; trademarks in source additionally bear a negative effect on FDI while patent
duration and protection from loss of rights in source become irrelevant. All other IPR
variables retain their effects. The comparison with the results for developing countries
reveals considerable parameter heterogeneity: Both country groups have only the negative
effect of trademarks in host in common. For developing countries, stronger copyrights in
the source show decisive evidence for lowering FDI; the positive effects of protection from
loss of rights and patent coverage show only weak relevance with inclusion probabilities
below 70%.
In general, for the volume of FDI into developed countries, IPR protection in the host
plays a more important role whereas for developing countries, IPRs on the source side
matter. This indicates that FDI motives vary with the FDI destination. Imitation risks
and spillovers are an important factor for investments in developed countries. This could
indicate that the investments are more technology intensive or that imitation capabilities
are higher such that insufficient patent protection poses a significant threat to MNE.
As host patent protection has no effect for FDI flows into developing countries, the
knowledge transferred may not be very sophisticated and therefore not patented. Another
explanation could be that the threat of imitation is not severe due to the low technology
level of domestic firms in developing countries.
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Table 3.1: IPRs in the split sample
Developed Host Country Developing Host Country
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
(intensive margin) (extensive margin) (intensive margin) (extensive margin)
incl. post. post. incl. post. post. incl. post. post. incl. post. post.
prob. mean stdev prob. mean stdev prob. mean stdev prob. mean stdev
Patent enforcement host 1 0.888 0.264 0.07 0.016 0.068 0.01 -0.001 0.03 0.00 0 0.013
Patent enforcement source 1 1.327 0.34 0.00 0 0.013 0.02 -0.009 0.123 0.03 0.015 0.096
Protect. loss of rights host 1 0.86 0.248 0.02 -0.004 0.039 0.01 0.004 0.16 0.01 0.003 0.032
Trademark source 1 -1.629 0.41 0.00 0.001 0.021 0.05 -0.037 0.294 0.14 0.144 0.393
Trademark host 0.99 -1.046 0.401 0.45 0.34 0.418 1 -4.008 1.658 0.01 -0.002 0.051
Patent duration host 0.96 -1.465 0.7 0.00 -0.001 0.022 0.01 0.002 0.297 0.03 0.023 0.157
Patent duration source 0.28 -0.463 0.875 0.16 0.258 0.635 0.05 -0.067 0.694 0.31 0.451 0.741
Protect. loss of rights source 0.09 0.038 0.151 1 -0.891 0.186 0.68 0.501 0.617 0.01 0.001 0.026
Member patent treaty host 0.07 0.041 0.194 0.00 0 0.013 0.01 -0.005 0.184 0.01 -0.005 0.076
Copyright source 0.05 -0.035 0.198 0.01 0.007 0.076 1 -2.315 3.024 0.28 0.387 0.683
Patent coverage source 0.01 0.005 0.075 0.83 -0.92 0.509 0.60 0.895 0.997 0.74 0.834 0.575
Member patent treaty source 0.01 -0.002 0.055 0.17 -0.181 0.427 0.02 -0.018 1.326 1 1.958 0.491
Copyright host 0.01 -0.001 0.045 0.02 0.011 0.086 0.02 0.014 0.437 0.60 -0.883 0.811
Patent coverage host 0.01 0 0.027 0.01 0.003 0.034 0.01 -0.001 0.205 0.66 0.693 0.574
Regressors with an inclusion probability >50% in the global sample are shaded.
None of the first stage IPR variables that showed an effect for the global sample is
relevant for either country group individually. Better protection from loss of rights and
patent coverage in source lower the likelihood of investments in developed host countries.
This indicates that firms divert into developed countries when patent protection in the
home market is insufficient. For developing host countries, weak evidence for a positive
effect of patent coverage in host and source and a negative effect of better copyright
protection are obtained. The only decisive effect is a positive influence of membership in
patent treaties of source countries. Thus, as for the intensive margin, IPRs in source are
more important in the decision to invest into FDI in developing countries than IPRs in
the host country.
Table 3.5 in the appendix shows the complete results for the split dataset. For both
stages and country groups, the gravity variables are relevant. Compared to the global
estimation, the sets of relevant regressors are more parsimonious for the split samples.
The second stage coefficients show considerable overlap with the global sample, especially
for developed countries. As for the IPR variables, developing countries show substantial
99
parameter heterogeneity compared to developed countries. Not surprisingly, a number of
risk factors are not relevant for developed host countries like religious tension, external
and internal conflicts, democracy and rule of law. For developing countries, a certain
degree of opportunism seems to support FDI flows as military presence in politics, weak
law enforcement and corruption increase FDI flows. On the other hand, better socio-
economic development and fewer internal conflicts increase FDI. Interestingly, per capita
income increases flows from capital-abundant to capital-scarce host countries when the
host is developed but is not relevant for developing hosts.
3.7 Conclusion
The inclusion of IPR variables in a large panel of aggregate binational FDI flows shows
the relevance of patent protection as well as trademark and copyright institutions for the
intensive and extensive margins of FDI. Compared to the results in Eicher et al. (2011a),
who use the same methodological approach but do not take account of IPR variables,
HeckitBMA delivers a similar set of relevant variables for the intensive margin (volume)
of FDI but results considerably differ for the extensive margin (decision to invest). For
the global sample, protection from loss of patent rights and patent enforcement show
clear evidence for the importance of de facto patent protection and the sensitivity of
FDI firms to potential knowledge leakages. Trademark protection on both ends increases
the likelihood of FDI while stronger trademarks in host countries decrease its volume,
indicating a substitution effect between FDI and trade in which production is replaced
by distribution networks that require a lower investment. The separate analysis of
developed and developing countries shows substantial heterogeneity between the two
samples. Patent protection is much more relevant for developed countries, probably due
to a high technology intensity of FDI flows and better imitation capabilities in developed
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hosts. The weak evidence for patent right effects in developing countries indicates few
concerns about the risk of imitation.
While the effects of IPR protection allow some inference on the composition of FDI
and underlying motives, aggregate FDI flows are likely to combine several potentially
opposing effects which impede inferences about the presence of and influence on individual
FDI motives. Nevertheless, the results indicate the importance of internalization and
the motive of technological-exploiting rather than technology-seeking FDI flows by the
positive effects of patent protection. The irrelevance of patent rights for FDI into
developing countries suggests that FDI flows do not contain crucial knowledge capital. At
the same time, distribution purposes are revealed by the effects of trademark protection
as are tax considerations by FDI firms. We derive some evidence for vertical FDI from
the positive effect of per capita income differentials. Horizontal and export-platform
theories find no convincing support. Differences between developing and developed
country determinants demonstrate that a separate analysis is required to disentangle the
effects on each country group.
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3.A Data description and regression results
Table 3.2: Frequency table
Source Host
total non-zero total non-zero
developed countries
Australia 271 117 273 156
Austria 270 179 294 121
Belgium 312 0 316 0
Canada 278 120 289 128
Denmark 155 108 153 77
Finland 234 163 255 103
France 285 265 255 227
Greece 165 28 162 49
Ireland 289 115 297 150
Italy 250 213 251 172
Japan 308 258 278 133
Netherlands 286 239 282 178
Norway 162 78 162 64
Poland 24 11 27 18
Portugal 159 103 149 99
Spain 259 212 258 198
Sweden 249 169 292 148
Switzerland 242 198 249 111
United Kingdom 276 244 298 191
United States 281 259 271 210
developing countries
Argentina 298 45 311 116
Brazil 223 37 232 89
Chile 267 20 270 86
Colombia 301 26 306 64
Costa Rica 155 4 154 1
Indonesia 140 13 109 31
Malaysia 258 42 256 82
Mexico 259 32 238 162
Panama 30 0 30 0
Philippines 166 19 170 57
South Africa 155 30 139 47
Turkey 303 60 290 115
Venezuela 276 46 270 70
total 7586 3453 7586 3453
developed 4755 3079 4811 2533
developing 2831 374 2775 920
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Table 3.3: Regressors
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source
APEC 0.06 0.25 0 1 Eicher and Henn (2011)
Bilateral RTA 0.02 0.14 0 1 Eicher and Henn (2011)
Border 0.05 0.23 0 1 Eicher and Henn (2011)
Bureaucracy host 3.31 0.82 1 4 International Country Risk Guide
Bureaucracy source 3.29 0.82 1 4 International Country Risk Guide
Colony 0.04 0.20 0 1 Eicher and Henn (2011)
Common language 0.14 0.34 0 1 Razin et al. (2008)
Copyright host 0.55 0.13 0.17 0.87 Reynolds (2003)
Copyright source 0.55 0.13 0.17 0.87 Reynolds (2003)
Corruption host 4.30 1.28 1.08 6 International Country Risk Guide
Corruption source 4.27 1.27 1.08 6 International Country Risk Guide
Coverage host 0.67 0.28 0 1 Park (2008)
Coverage source 0.67 0.28 0 1 Park (2008)
Currency union dollar 0.00 0.02 0 1 Eicher and Henn (2011)
Currency union euro 0.02 0.14 0 1 Eicher and Henn (2011)
Democracy host 5.21 1.01 1 6 International Country Risk Guide
Democracy source 5.19 1.02 1 6 International Country Risk Guide
Duration host 0.92 0.12 0.50 1 Park (2008)
Duration source 0.92 0.12 0.50 1 Park (2008)
Education difference -0.05 3.17 -8.49 8.49 Razin et al. (2008)
EEA 0.14 0.34 0 1 Eicher and Henn (2011)
EFTA 0.01 0.09 0 1 Eicher and Henn (2011)
Enforcement host 0.73 0.36 0 1 Park (2008)
Enforcement source 0.73 0.36 0 1 Park (2008)
Ethnic tension host 4.95 1.15 1 6 International Country Risk Guide
Ethnic tension source 4.93 1.16 1 6 International Country Risk Guide
EU 0.14 0.35 0 1 Eicher and Henn (2011)
External conflict host 11.17 1.13 7.50 12 International Country Risk Guide
External conflict source 11.15 1.14 7.50 12 International Country Risk Guide
Financial risk host 40.47 6.41 18 50 Razin et al. (2008)
Financial risk source 40.43 6.41 18 50 Razin et al. (2008)
GDP Growth host 0.03 0.04 -0.13 0.35 constructed from Razin et al. (2008)
GDP Growth source 0.03 0.03 -0.13 0.13 constructed from Razin et al. (2008)
Government stability host 8.08 1.95 2 11 International Country Risk Guide
Government stability source 8.09 1.94 2 11 International Country Risk Guide
Internal conflict host 10.35 2.00 3.75 12 International Country Risk Guide
Internal conflict source 10.32 2.01 3.75 12 International Country Risk Guide
Investment profile host 7.29 1.76 3 11.17 International Country Risk Guide
Investment profile source 7.29 1.75 3 11.17 International Country Risk Guide
Investment treaty 0.16 0.36 0 1 Neumayer and Spess (2005)
Lag FDI dummy 0.44 0.50 0 1 Eicher et al. (2011a)
LAIA 0.04 0.20 0 1 Eicher and Henn (2011)
Law and order host 4.90 1.34 1 6 International Country Risk Guide
Law and order source 4.88 1.34 1 6 International Country Risk Guide
Log distance 8.13 0.99 4.92 9.40 Razin et al. (2008)
Log FDI 1.81 2.61 -2.85 11.14 Razin et al. (2008)
Log GDP per capita host 9.38 1.05 6.89 10.75 constructed from RST(2008)
Log GDP per capita source 9.36 1.06 6.89 10.75 constructed from RST(2008)
Market size host 5.68 1.32 2.19 9.10 Razin et al. (2008)
Market size source 5.66 1.30 2.19 9.10 Razin et al. (2008)
Membership host 0.68 0.31 0 1 Park (2008)
Membership source 0.67 0.31 0 1 Park (2008)
Military host 5.12 1.29 1 6 International Country Risk Guide
Military source 5.10 1.30 1 6 International Country Risk Guide
NAFTA 0.01 0.08 0 1 Eicher and Henn (2011)
Negative lag FDI dummy 0.06 0.24 0 1 constructed from RST(2008)*
Protection f. loss of rights host 0.46 0.27 0 1 Park (2008)
Protection f. loss of rights source 0.46 0.28 0 1 Park (2008)
Real exchange rate 103.91 31.87 16.73 597.64 USDA http://www.ers.usda.gov
Religion host 5.34 0.94 1.50 6 International Country Risk Guide
Religion source 5.33 0.94 1.50 6 International Country Risk Guide
Socio-econ. development host 6.71 1.73 2 11 International Country Risk Guide
Socio-econ. developm. source 6.71 1.73 2 11 International Country Risk Guide
Tax host 0.22 0.11 0 0.73 1980-92: Altshuler et al. (2000); 1994-
02: IRS/SOI, World Tax Database
Tax source 0.23 0.11 0 0.73 1980-92: Altshuler et al. (2000); 1994-
02: IRS/SOI, World Tax Database
TFP Host 40.54 18.03 6.48 74.66 Razin et al. (2008)
TFP Source 40.31 18.21 6.48 74.66 Razin et al. (2008)
Trademark host 0.49 0.15 0.19 0.84 Reynolds (2003)
Trademark source 0.49 0.15 0.19 0.84 Reynolds (2003)
Table 3.4: Global sample
Global Eicher et al. (2011a)
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
(intensive margin) (extensive margin) (intensive margin) (extensive margin)
incl. post. post. incl. post. post. incl. post. post. incl. post. post.
prob. mean stdev prob. mean stdev prob. mean stdev prob. mean stdev
APEC 1 0.761 0.177 0.02 0.004 0.029 1 0.761 0.133 0.72 0.159 0.115
Bilateral trade agreement 1 0.499 0.136 0.061 0.009 0.039 0.06 0.023 0.115 0.00 0.000 0.001
Colony 1 1.080 0.190 1 0.625 0.121 1 1.074 0.178 0.06 0.016 0.073
Common language 1 0.426 0.136 0.01 0.001 0.014 1 0.642 0.113 1 -0.505 0.106
Corruption host 1 0.181 0.064 0.00 0.000 0.002 0.97 0.121 0.053 0.02 0.001 0.004
Corruption source 1 0.254 0.063 0.81 0.072 0.042 1 0.221 0.051 0.00 0.000 0.002
Exchange rate host/source 1 -0.006 0.002 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.19 0.000 0.001 0.08 0.001 0.003
Log distance 1 -0.733 0.052 1 -0.178 0.035 1 -0.682 0.043 0.12 0.015 0.044
Market size host 1 1.031 0.054 1 0.257 0.028 1 -1.036 0.124 0.02 0.001 0.005
Market size source 1 0.969 0.055 1 0.263 0.034 1 0.543 0.124 0.01 0.000 0.004
Negative lag FDI dummy 1 -0.374 0.122 1 0.668 0.102 0.99 -0.296 0.119 0.00 0.000 0.001
p.c. income host 1 -1.424 0.171 0.01 -0.001 0.009 1 1.016 0.042 1 0.505 0.099
Patent duration host 1 -1.805 0.551 0.26 0.223 0.405 · · · · · ·
Patent duration source 1 -1.832 0.638 0.00 0.000 0.014 · · · · · ·
Patent enforcement source 1 0.755 0.249 0.90 0.312 0.140 · · · · · ·
Protect. loss of rights source 1 0.919 0.212 0.02 -0.003 0.027 · · · · · ·
Religious tension host 1 0.190 0.066 0.01 0.000 0.005 1 0.284 0.054 1 0.249 0.019
Socioeconomic dev. host 1 0.123 0.042 0.17 0.008 0.020 0.14 0.006 0.020 0.00 0.001 0.044
Tax host 1 -5.196 0.512 0.71 -0.706 0.512 1 -4.636 0.435 1 -0.201 0.025
Tax source 1 -4.992 0.509 0.17 -0.115 0.280 1 -4.462 0.446 1 0.244 0.026
TFP host 1 0.052 0.008 0.68 -0.005 0.004 1 0.040 0.006 0.01 0.000 0.004
Trademark host 1 -1.260 0.368 0.75 0.588 0.390 · · · · · ·
p.c. income source 0.99 0.562 0.185 0.01 0.002 0.026 1 0.824 0.044 0.01 0.000 0.005
Investment profile host 0.99 -0.132 0.049 0.00 0.000 0.002 0.02 -0.001 0.007 0.01 0.000 0.003
Internal conflict source 0.99 -0.112 0.044 0.00 0.000 0.001 0.16 -0.010 0.029 0.01 0.000 0.001
Democracy host 0.98 0.177 0.074 0.03 0.002 0.012 0.02 0.001 0.009 0.01 0.000 0.002
Patent enforcement host 0.97 0.442 0.196 0.00 0.000 0.007 · · · · · ·
Protect. loss of rights host 0.94 0.425 0.220 0.19 -0.065 0.147 · · · · · ·
Bureaucracy source 0.90 0.277 0.160 0.00 0.000 0.004 0.79 0.188 0.140 0.01 0.000 0.001
Internal conflict host 0.79 0.066 0.048 0.01 0.000 0.002 0.98 0.089 0.037 0.02 0.005 0.046
Government stability host 0.72 0.058 0.049 0.00 0.000 0.001 0.05 0.002 0.011 0.00 0.000 0.001
Religious tension source 0.44 -0.066 0.091 0.03 -0.002 0.013 0.01 0.000 0.006 0.99 -0.011 0.003
TFP source 0.41 0.005 0.008 0.03 0.000 0.001 0.08 0.001 0.003 0.01 0.003 0.051
Growth host 0.37 1.005 1.598 0.01 0.004 0.071 1 3.073 1.071 0.00 -0.001 0.030
Socioeconomic dev. source 0.20 0.013 0.031 0.01 0.000 0.004 0.06 0.004 0.017 0.01 0.000 0.001
External conflict source 0.12 -0.010 0.032 0.00 0.000 0.002 0.01 0.000 0.003 0.09 -0.040 0.140
Same RTA 0.07 0.030 0.135 0.05 0.017 0.080 0.03 0.004 0.033 0.00 0.000 0.001
LAIA 0.06 -0.037 0.180 0.00 0.000 0.008 0.98 -1.113 0.490 0.01 0.000 0.008
Democracy source 0.06 0.007 0.034 0.00 0.000 0.003 0.03 0.002 0.016 0.01 0.000 0.002
Growth source 0.04 0.095 0.599 0.01 0.007 0.109 0.01 0.004 0.145 0.00 0.000 0.000
Trademark source 0.03 -0.014 0.097 1 0.997 0.211 · · · · · ·
Ethnic tension host 0.02 0.001 0.011 1 0.097 0.025 0.01 0.000 0.004 0.68 0.030 0.023
Copyright source 0.02 -0.007 0.078 0.05 0.029 0.133 · · · · · ·
Patent coverage host 0.02 -0.004 0.052 0.04 0.012 0.065 · · · · · ·
Copyright host 0.01 0.005 0.064 0.30 -0.208 0.348 · · · · · ·
External conflict host 0.01 -0.001 0.009 0.01 0.000 0.005 0.02 0.000 0.006 0.00 0.000 0.002
Military source 0.01 -0.001 0.013 0.01 0.000 0.005 0.02 -0.001 0.013 0.28 0.043 0.073
Education diff. (source to host) 0.01 0.000 0.003 0.01 0.000 0.002 0.02 0.000 0.003 0.02 0.001 0.006
Government stability source 0.01 0.000 0.005 0.00 0.000 0.001 0.02 0.000 0.006 0.01 0.000 0.009
EEA 0.01 0.001 0.019 0.00 0.000 0.009 0.01 0.000 0.014 0.29 -0.001 0.002
Financial risk host 0.01 0.000 0.001 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.01 0.000 0.001 0.83 0.058 0.032
Currency e 0.01 0.002 0.030 0.00 0.000 0.010 0.01 0.001 0.026 0.00 0.000 0.001
Financial Risk Source 0.01 0.000 0.002 0.00 0.000 0.001 0.01 0.000 0.001 1 0.409 0.054
Law source 0.01 0.000 0.009 0.10 0.009 0.029 0.01 0.000 0.008 0.13 -0.009 0.025
Law host 0.01 0.000 0.007 0.02 0.001 0.008 0.46 0.052 0.071 0.01 0.000 0.003
Membership patent treaty host 0.01 -0.002 0.039 0.01 -0.002 0.032 · · · · · ·
Membership patent treaty source 0.01 0.002 0.041 0.00 0.000 0.011 · · · · · ·
Investment profile source 0.01 0.000 0.003 0.02 -0.001 0.006 0.96 0.076 0.035 0.10 0.004 0.014
Military host 0.01 0.000 0.006 0.01 0.000 0.003 0.01 0.000 0.005 0.65 -0.401 0.331
EFTA 0.01 0.001 0.029 0.00 0.000 0.013 0.01 -0.001 0.028 1 0.836 0.078
NAFTA 0.01 -0.001 0.033 0.01 0.004 0.055 0.01 0.003 0.050 0.00 0.001 0.025
Border 0.01 0.000 0.014 1 -0.608 0.130 0.02 0.003 0.032 0.01 -0.002 0.024
Bureaucracy host 0.01 0.000 0.008 0.02 -0.001 0.012 0.03 0.003 0.023 0.01 0.000 0.003
Patent coverage source 0.01 0.000 0.024 0.02 0.007 0.051 · · · · · ·
Ethnic tension source 0.01 0.000 0.004 1 0.100 0.023 0.92 0.090 0.051 0.00 0.000 0.011
EU 0.01 0.000 0.010 0.02 -0.003 0.027 0.01 0.000 0.010 0.01 0.000 0.002
Currency $ 0.00 · · 0.00 -0.019 76.115 1 4.434 1.194 0.05 0.003 0.012
Market potential · · · · · · 0.93 -0.433 0.235 0.00 0.000 0.004
Lag FDI dummy (excl. restr.) 1 2.365 0.053 1 2.241 0.038
IMRa -0.371 0.099 -0.33 0.085
BIC -3236.626 -27581.85
N 3453 7586 5329 14462
a In the 2nd stage the IMR is always included. The exclusion restriction is only included in the 1st stage. Year
dummies were included in the estimation and have an inclusion probability of 1, they are omitted from the table.
Table 3.5: Split sample
Developed Host Country Developing Host Country
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
(intensive margin) (extensive margin) (intensive margin) (extensive margin)
incl. post. post. incl. post. post. incl. post. post. incl. post. post.
prob. mean stdev prob. mean stdev prob. mean stdev prob. mean stdev
APEC 1 0.862 0.221 0.01 0.002 0.023 0.01 0.001 0.205 0.01 0.001 0.023
Colony 1 0.912 0.227 0.02 0.004 0.036 1 1.059 0.401 1 1.71 0.349
Common language 1 0.408 0.151 0.01 0.002 0.02 1 1.045 0.353 0.01 0.001 0.018
Corruption host 1 0.235 0.064 0.92 0.169 0.062 0.91 -0.222 0.303 0.02 -0.001 0.014
Corruption source 1 0.264 0.076 0.50 0.061 0.067 1 0.291 0.321 0.67 0.135 0.109
External conflict host 1 -0.154 0.058 0.00 0 0.002 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0 0.005
Internal conflict source 1 0.225 0.059 0.01 0 0.005 0.05 -0.005 0.048 0.01 -0.001 0.009
Log distance 1 -0.759 0.057 1 -0.169 0.044 1 -1.141 1.731 1 -0.459 0.098
Market sizehost 1 0.945 0.057 1 0.256 0.041 1 1.37 0.376 1 0.409 0.063
Market size source 1 1.045 0.066 1 0.428 0.055 1 0.844 0.264 1 0.58 0.083
Negative lag FDI dummy 1 -0.404 0.136 1 0.758 0.123 0.01 -0.001 0.022 0.14 0.063 0.17
p.c. income host 1 -1.622 0.225 0.85 -0.4 0.209 0.01 0.003 0.103 0.02 -0.004 0.032
p.c. income source 1 0.671 0.133 0.17 0.074 0.176 0.01 -0.001 0.092 0.02 0.004 0.038
Patent enforcement host 1 0.888 0.264 0.07 0.016 0.068 0.01 -0.001 0.03 0.00 0 0.013
Patent enforcement source 1 1.327 0.34 0.00 0 0.013 0.02 -0.009 0.123 0.03 0.015 0.096
Protect. loss of rights host 1 0.86 0.248 0.02 -0.004 0.039 0.01 0.004 0.16 0.01 0.003 0.032
Tax host 1 -4.625 0.559 0.01 -0.006 0.07 0.01 -0.005 0.417 0.01 -0.006 0.084
Tax source 1 -6.139 0.608 1 -2.092 0.389 1 -7.474 1.142 0.14 -0.173 0.475
TFP host 1 0.044 0.011 0.18 -0.003 0.007 1 -0.036 0.021 0.35 -0.009 0.014
Trademark source 1 -1.629 0.41 0.00 0.001 0.021 0.05 -0.037 0.294 0.14 0.144 0.393
Trademark host 0.99 -1.046 0.401 0.45 0.34 0.418 1 -4.008 1.658 0.01 -0.002 0.051
Democracy source 0.98 0.312 0.133 0.01 0 0.008 0.02 0.003 0.043 0.01 0 0.009
Patent duration host 0.96 -1.465 0.7 0.00 -0.001 0.022 0.01 0.002 0.297 0.03 0.023 0.157
External conflict source 0.92 -0.142 0.076 0.06 0.007 0.029 0.01 0.001 0.014 0.00 0 0.003
Growth source 0.77 5.732 4.181 0.02 0.08 0.631 0.01 -0.018 0.673 0.02 -0.048 0.455
Patent duration source 0.28 -0.463 0.875 0.16 0.258 0.635 0.05 -0.067 0.694 0.31 0.451 0.741
Investment profile source 0.17 -0.013 0.037 0.27 -0.024 0.044 0.01 0.001 0.012 0.78 -0.114 0.072
Bureaucracy host 0.16 0.037 0.105 0.00 0 0.003 0.01 -0.001 0.017 0.22 -0.047 0.097
Religious tension host 0.14 -0.018 0.055 0.01 0 0.005 0.01 0.001 0.026 0.05 0.007 0.033
Ethnic tension source 0.12 0.012 0.04 1 0.215 0.037 0.01 0 0.098 1 0.245 0.051
Military host 0.11 -0.014 0.049 0.00 0 0.002 0.01 0 0.017 0.01 0 0.005
Military source 0.11 0.028 0.1 0.05 -0.016 0.077 0.95 -0.462 0.285 1 -0.381 0.091
Same RTA 0.09 0.067 0.259 0.03 0.015 0.088 0.02 -0.006 0.174 0.00 0 0.015
Protect. loss of rights source 0.09 0.038 0.151 1 -0.891 0.186 0.68 0.501 0.617 0.01 0.001 0.026
Membership patent treaty host 0.07 0.041 0.194 0.00 0 0.013 0.01 -0.005 0.184 0.01 -0.005 0.076
NAFTA 0.07 -0.041 0.196 0.00 0.001 0.032 0.01 0.002 1.547 0.02 0.078 155.676
Copyright source 0.05 -0.035 0.198 0.01 0.007 0.076 1 -2.315 3.024 0.28 0.387 0.683
TFP source 0.05 0 0.003 0.16 -0.003 0.007 0.15 -0.003 0.008 0.01 0 0.002
Growth host 0.04 0.103 0.635 0.09 0.19 0.684 0.08 -0.213 0.878 0.00 0 0.042
Socioeconomic dev. source 0.03 0.003 0.02 0.10 0.011 0.035 1 0.214 0.077 1 0.228 0.06
Socioeconomic dev. host 0.03 0.001 0.01 0.01 0 0.003 0.94 0.126 0.106 0.00 0 0.002
Currency e 0.02 0.005 0.051 0.00 0 0.011 . . . . . .
Democracy host 0.02 0.002 0.017 0.01 0 0.004 0.01 0 0.013 0.00 0 0.003
EEA 0.02 0.002 0.026 0.01 0.002 0.025 . . . . . .
Patent coverage source 0.01 0.005 0.075 0.83 -0.92 0.509 0.60 0.895 0.997 0.74 0.834 0.575
Law host 0.01 -0.001 0.013 0.04 0.003 0.015 1 -0.25 0.461 0.01 0 0.006
Education diff. (source to host) 0.01 0 0.005 0.00 0 0.001 0.01 0 0.004 0.99 -0.137 0.043
Exchange rate host/source 0.01 0 0 0.00 0 0 1 -0.007 0.002 0.02 0 0
Border 0.01 0.002 0.028 0.07 -0.022 0.091 0.09 -0.088 1.369 1 -1.806 0.44
Internal conflict host 0.01 0 0.006 0.00 0 0.002 1 0.265 0.287 0.00 0 0.002
EFTA 0.01 0.002 0.038 0.00 0 0.015 . . . . . .
Law source 0.01 0 0.012 0.01 0 0.006 0.17 -0.046 0.122 0.22 0.045 0.091
EU 0.01 0.001 0.014 0.01 -0.001 0.017 . . . . . .
Bureaucracy source 0.01 0.001 0.026 0.01 0 0.014 0.02 0.004 0.042 0.00 0 0.01
Membership patent treaty source 0.01 -0.002 0.055 0.17 -0.181 0.427 0.02 -0.018 1.326 1 1.958 0.491
Copyright host 0.01 -0.001 0.045 0.02 0.011 0.086 0.02 0.014 0.437 0.60 -0.883 0.811
Bilateral trade agreement 0.01 0.001 0.021 0.01 0 0.01 0.56 0.171 0.4 0.00 0 0.008
Government stability source 0.01 0 0.005 0.02 -0.001 0.009 0.07 0.006 0.03 0.01 0 0.004
Ethnic tension host 0.01 0 0.005 0.18 0.012 0.029 0.48 0.061 0.177 0.01 0 0.006
Religious tension source 0.01 0 0.011 0.01 0 0.007 0.02 0.004 0.05 0.00 0 0.006
Government stability host 0.01 0 0.003 0.00 0 0.001 0.01 0 0.007 0.00 0 0.003
Financial risk host 0.01 0 0.001 0.01 0 0.002 0.02 0.001 0.01 0.01 0 0.002
Patent coverage host 0.01 0 0.027 0.01 0.003 0.034 0.01 -0.001 0.205 0.66 0.693 0.574
Investment profile host 0.01 0 0.003 0.00 0 0.002 0.04 -0.003 0.029 0.00 0 0.002
Financial risk source 0.01 0 0.001 0.01 0 0.001 0.90 0.048 0.03 0.01 0 0.002
Currency $ 0.01 . . 0.00 -0.013 93.246 0.01 . . 0.00 -0.017 97.825
LAIA . . . . . . 1 -2.522 1.031 0.00 0 0.012
lag FDI dummy (excl. restr.) 1 2.388 0.068 1 1.947 0.102
IMRa -0.289 0.128 -0.451 0.344
BIC -2428.509 -798.934
N 2533 4811 920 2775
a In the 2nd stage the IMR is always included. The exclusion restriction is only included in the 1st stage. Year
dummies were included in the estimation and have an inclusion probability of 1, they are omitted from the table.
Regressors with an inclusion probability >50% in the global sample are shaded.
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